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GIVING  THE  FEDERAL  CIRCUIT  A  RUN  FOR
ITS  MONEY:  CHALLENGING  PATENTS
IN  THE  PTAB
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss*
Passage of the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA)1 inaugurated three
new procedures for challenging patents in the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO).  Inter partes review (IPR) supplements the ex parte reexami-
nation system and replaces its variant, inter partes reexamination;2 the transi-
tional program for covered business methods (CBM) institutionalizes what
had been a more informal mechanism for reviewing such claims,3 and post-
grant review (PGR) initiates a way to challenge patent claims immediately
© 2015 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Pauline Newman Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Engelberg Center on
Innovation Law and Policy.  I am grateful to the co-directors of the Engelberg Center and
to Rachel Barkow, Annemarie Hassett, Helen Hershkoff, Patricia Martone, and John
Pegram for their helpful comments, and to David Kappos for arranging a panel discussion
with Judge Faith Hochberg and Micky Minhas, where I learned a great deal.  The Filomen
D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund of NYU provided financial support for
this research.
1 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
2 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012) (supplanting the inter partes reexamination procedure;
35 U.S.C. §§ 311–17 (pre-AIA—enacted in 1999); 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–07 (supplementing ex
parte reexamination).  These systems were generally perceived as underutilized, see Dale L.
Carlson & Robert A. Migliorini, Past as Prologue for Patent Reform: Experience in Japan with
Oppositions Suggests an Alternative Approach for the U.S., 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
101, 105 (2006) (noting that only fifty-three requests for inter partes reexamination were
filed between 2001 and 2004); Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative
Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition—and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COM-
PUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 63, 66 (1998), or inadequate to protect patent quality, see Brian J.
Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L.
REV. DIALOGUE 93, 95–96 (2014).
3 AIA § 18 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 321 note).  For the earlier procedure, see Patent
Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second-Pair-of-Eyes Review, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFF., http://1.usa.gov/OQZfEj (last modified Sept. 6, 2015). See generally David Orozco,
Administrative Patent Levers, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1 (2012) (discussing the tightening of the
patent review process in the area of business patents).
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upon issuance.4  The increased importance of knowledge production
throughout the global economy, coupled with the popularity of the Patent
Cooperation Treaty, which eases the burden of filing in multiple countries,5
had expanded the number of patent applications and swamped the PTO’s
examination resources.6  The resulting thickets of patents—and especially
the increase in patent assertions by nonpracticing entities (NPEs)—were
thought to be imposing a high tax on innovation.  At the urging of the
National Academies of Science and with substantial support from the Ameri-
can Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA),7 Congress adopted these
procedures to improve the likelihood that invalid patents would be quickly
weeded out of the system.
To be sure, there are other ways to tackle the problem of low-quality
patents.  Increasing PTO resources would give examiners more time to
search the literature and ensure that all the requirements for patentability
are satisfied before patent rights are granted.  Indeed, the AIA did some of
this as well: it gave the PTO the power to set fees and retain them.8  But there
are limits to that approach.  As Mark Lemley has convincingly argued, many
patents have little commercial significance; examining them more thor-
oughly wastes social resources.9  Furthermore, there are inevitable distortions
in the process.  Although examination is intended to protect the integrity of
the public domain and the interest of the public in full disclosure of pro-
tected inventions, examiners deal only with those aspiring to acquire protec-
tion.  While the PTO no longer follows an avowed “customer service
paradigm” aimed at satisfying applicants,10 systematic contact with only one
constituency can lead to unconscious bias.  Furthermore, as Melissa Wasser-
man, Michael Frakes, and Rob Merges have demonstrated, factors such as the
pressure to earn maintenance fees, time constraints, informational asymme-
4 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–29.
5 Patent Cooperation Treaty, Preamble, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S.
231.
6 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT
142–52 (2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/USPTOFY2014PAR.pdf.
7 See generally STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY loc.
ii (2004) (ebook) (discussing patent reform), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record
_id=10976; Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II,
21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 601 (2012) (citing Patent Quality Improvement: Post-Grant Opposition:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 29 (2004) (statement of Michael Kirk, Director, AIPLA)).
8 AIA § 10 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 41–42).
9 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495
(2001).
10 James Farrand et. al., “Reform” Arrives in Patent Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51 IDEA
357, 437 (2011) (internal quotations omitted) (noting that the PTO viewed patent appli-
cants as the PTO’s customers “without adequately recognizing the interests of the pub-
lic.”); see also, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT 2 (2000), http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/about/stratplan/ar/USPTO
FY2000PAR.pdf (noting a “rise in customer . . . satisfaction”).
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tries, metrics for rating examiners’ performance, and high examiner turno-
ver can create other pathologies that lead to over-granting.11
Better, to economists like Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, is to devote addi-
tional resources only to those patents that matter.12  Of course, litigation
does exactly that: patents that are asserted or challenged in a declaratory
judgment action are, by definition, significant to someone.  But litigation has
its own problems.  The process is extremely expensive.13  While these heavy
costs are borne only by the challenger, the industry as a whole enjoys the
benefits of invalidation.14  Thus, there is a collective action problem: every
would-be challenger has an incentive to sit back and wait for a competitor to
do the heavy lifting.15  A patent can thus have an impact on an industry even
when the industry questions its validity.  In addition, not everyone who is
affected by the exclusivity of a patent has standing to challenge it in court.16
To be sure, the patentee’s competitors will often have direct enough inter-
ests, but as members of the same industry, they are unlikely to make argu-
ments that could imperil their own patent holdings.  Accordingly, there may
be patents that impair the public interest that no one has both an incentive
and the capacity to challenge.  For example, it took decades for patents on
isolated genes to be questioned.17  The parties who finally did so (the ACLU
and various doctors and patients) barely managed to convince a court that
11 See generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding Affect
Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67
(2013) (analyzing the impact of funding on USPTO decisionmaking); Robert P. Merges,
As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999) (analyzing how business concept patents
overload the patent system); Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure
to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011).
12 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN
PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 22
(2004).
13 See, e.g., AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, 2013 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
(2013), http://www.patentinsurance.com/custdocs/2013aipla%20survey.pdf (estimating
that patent infringement litigation costs over $2 million through trial for cases worth less
than $25 million and close to $6 million for the most valuable cases).
14 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 335 (1971)
(abolishing the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel).
15 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004) (explaining the problems in the existing adminis-
trative system); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (“Not only are opposition regimes ripe with
collective action and free rider problems, they do not account for the possibility of collu-
sion between the patentee and holder of patent-defeating prior art.”).
16 See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 498, 500 (2015).
17 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Moore, J., concurring in part) (“[T]he United States Patent Office
has allowed patents on isolated DNA sequences for decades . . . .”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part
sub nom., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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one of them was affected in a manner that met the standing requirements of
federal law.18
Even after a challenge is brought, there are obstacles to successfully
attacking invalid claims.  Deference to administrative procedures, along with
a provision of patent law providing that “[a] patent shall be presumed valid,”
has led courts to assign to the challenger the burden of establishing invalidity
by clear and convincing evidence.19  While this burden seemingly makes little
sense in situations where the PTO did not find—and thus never reviewed—
all the evidence relevant to validity, the Supreme Court has insisted on fidel-
ity to that longstanding practice.20
Prior to 1982, there was also a problem of persistent inconsistencies
among the appellate courts hearing patent appeals, which led to forum shop-
ping, uncertainty, and (arguably) a flight from patents to trade secrecy.  The
Federal Circuit was established in 1982 to remedy that concern; it hears virtu-
ally all patent appeals arising from the district courts, the PTO, and the Inter-
national Trade Commission (ITC).21  But as I documented in a series of
articles,22 channeling cases to a single appellate court introduced new com-
plications.  The court apparently saw in its creation an expression of congres-
sional desire to strengthen protection.  Thus, it reduced the standards of
patentability; for example, it made it easier to find an invention nonobvious
and extended the scope of patentable subject matter (to include, for
instance, business methods).23  This deepened the patent thicket, which led
18 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1343–48 (Fed. Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
19 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid
of the APA?  What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269,
280–81 (2007) (alteration in original).
20 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46, 2252 (2011).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012).
22 See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Abolishing Exclusive Jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit:
A Response to Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 327 (2014); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing Experiment in Specialization, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit as an Institu-
tion: What Ought We to Expect?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 827 (2010); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787
(2008); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Percolation, Uniformity, and Coherent Adjudication: The Federal
Circuit Experience, 66 SMU L. REV. 505 (2013) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Percolation]; Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from the Supreme Court—and Vice Versa, 59
AM. U. L. REV. 787 (2010) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Learning].
23 See, e.g., In re Sang-Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the use of
common sense in determining obviousness); State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Signature Fin.
Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding business methods patentable).
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the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in increasing numbers of cases and to
reverse or modify the Federal Circuit’s resolution in most of them.24
Not only has the Federal Circuit had difficulty persuading others that it
has taken normatively appropriate positions,25 it has also had problems
implementing the Supreme Court’s views and guiding district court prac-
tice.26  Some scholars and judges have suggested revising the jurisdictional
rules to give other courts some authority over adjudicating patent disputes.27
This would increase percolation and bring other points of view, including an
antitrust perspective, to bear on questions of patentability, infringement,
defenses, and remedies.  But because practitioners prefer certainty and pre-
dictability, Congress is unlikely to make that change.28
The new procedures instituted by the AIA could remedy many of these
problems.  Because these challenges are adjudicated within the PTO, the Pat-
ent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB or Board), which hears these cases,
applies the same preponderance of the evidence standard used to determine
whether to grant a patent in the first place.29  Since the cost of engaging in
these administrative adjudications is lower than litigation, those who believe
the patent invalid may be less likely to wait for someone else to come forward.
Furthermore, the availability of a less expensive procedure to challenge pat-
ents could make the NPE business model less viable.  Both IPRs and PGRs
can be brought by any interested party.  Accordingly, the public can use the
procedures to vindicate interests that are not shared by the patent holder’s
rivals.  And because a request for a PGR must be made within nine months of
the issuance of the patent and all three procedures are subject to strict time
24 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 3222 (2010) (barring patents on abstrac-
tions); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (raising the standard of
nonobviousness).
25 See Dreyfuss, Percolation, supra note 22, at 515–18 (citing, among others, reactions of
the Supreme Court, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice).
26 For examples of the Federal Circuit’s difficulties, consider the Supreme Court’s
four attempts to narrow the scope of patentable subject matter, Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetic, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), and its attempts to retain the doctrine of equivalents,
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Warner-Jen-
kinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also generally Craig Allen Nard
& John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. Rev. 1619
(2007); Kathleen M. O’Malley et al., A Panel Discussion: Claim Construction from the Perspective
of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671 (2004).
27 See, e.g., Nard & Duffy, supra note 26, at 1642–50; Diane P. Wood, Keynote Address: Is
It Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit’s Exclusive Jurisdiction in Patent Cases?, 13 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2014).
28 See, e.g., Harold C. Wegner, Federal Circuit Exclusive Appellate Patent Jurisdiction: A
Response to Chief Judge Wood, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 394, 395 (2014).
29 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012).
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limits, invalid patents can be cleared quickly and more timely feedback pro-
vided to the examining corps.30
As important, these procedures have the potential to change the institu-
tional culture of both the PTO and the federal courts.  They require the PTO
to focus on the concerns of nonpatentees (that is, to consider challengers to
be among its “customers”) and to evaluate patents later in their life, after
more art pertinent to the question of validity has emerged.  Furthermore, the
PTAB is likely to be among the first to implement new Supreme Court pro-
nouncements; it will probably also be the first to consider questions raised by
the substantive changes made in the AIA.31  Unlike the district courts, which
must also grapple with these issues, the PTAB has expertise to cope with the
technical aspects of its cases: it is composed entirely of patent and technology
experts and there is an effort to staff each three-member panel with at least
one judge who has specific familiarity with the field of the patented inven-
tion.32  With these improvements over its predecessor, the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI), the PTAB could provide the Federal Cir-
cuit with a partner in the enterprise of interpreting patent law and imple-
menting Supreme Court decisions.  While it is true that the Federal Circuit,
as the reviewing court, has the final say,33 the PTAB breaks its isolation.  At
the same time, the thorough analysis furnished by the PTAB could give dis-
trict courts better guidance on how to apply the law to emerging
technologies.
The question is whether these salutary effects will, in fact, come to pass.
At this point, there have been several statistical studies of the new proce-
dures, including some by the PTO.  This Article is intended to look beyond
the numbers.  To that end, I read all the final written decisions in CBM
reviews handed down by the end of November 2014 as well as a set of final
written decision in IPRs, starting with the first case filed, more than fifty cases
in total.  In addition, I read a selection of decisions to institute review, deci-
sions on various motions, all the opinions issued by the Federal Circuit
reviewing the PTAB, as well as the considerable outpouring (mostly in the
form of blogs) published by those practicing before the PTAB.  This is very
30 Cf. Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System—
Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989 (2004) (analyzing the effi-
ciency effects of proposals for post-grant opposition procedures).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 181–185.
32 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (requiring “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific
ability”); Erin M. Dunston & Philip L. Hirschhorn, The New America Invents Act Post-Grant
Procedures: IPRs, CBMs, and PGRs—Effective Complements to or Alternative for Traditional IP
Litigation Strategies, in LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES 101, 105
(2014).  Appointees are drawn from the USPTO examining corps, other government agen-
cies, private practice, and industry. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., PATENT PUBLIC
ADVISORY COMMITTEE QUARTERLY MEETING: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD UPDATE (Feb.
12, 2014), http://www.uspto.gov/about/advisory/ppac/20140212_PPAC_PTABUp
date.pdf.
33 The standard of review is, however, a difficult question, see infra text accompanying
notes 227–278. R
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early in the life of these procedures; CBMs and IPRs began on September 16,
2012, and the PGR procedure can only be used to challenge patents issued
on applications filed after the AIA went into full effect on March 16, 2013.
Only a few PGR petitions have been publicly filed so far; the PTAB has insti-
tuted only two reviews, and as of this writing, no case has been decided.34
While the other two procedures have been in use for two years, the early
cases may be clearing a backlog of questionable patents and thus may not be
representative of future practice.35  Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has
reviewed very few final decisions of the PTAB under the new procedures.
Most of the cases have been decided without written opinion.36
Nonetheless, it is valuable to consider what has happened so far.  The
cases I considered were sufficient to provide a sense of how the procedures
operate and the opportunities they create to streamline—but also to game—
the system.  My main objective is directed at institutional questions, to help
the PTO and Congress as each considers changes to the system37 and to
gauge how well the PTAB could function to ameliorate the effect of Federal
Circuit isolation and provide a basis for the court to consider new perspec-
tives, write more persuasively, and provide better guidance.  A second goal is
34 The instituted cases are American Simmental Ass’n v. Leachman Cattle of Colorado, LLC,
No. PGR2015-00003 (P.T.A.B. June 19, 2015), and American Simmental Ass’n v. Leachman
Cattle of Colorado, LLC, No. PGR2015-00005 (P.T.A.B June 19, 2015).  As of June 29, 2015,
eleven PGRs had been filed. USPTO, https://ptabtrials.uspto.gov/prweb/PRWebLDAP2/
HcI5xOSeX_yQRYZAnTXXCg%5B%5B*/!STANDARD?UserIdentifier=searchuser (last
visited Oct. 27, 2015).
35 See Colleen Chien & Christian Helmers, Inter Partes Review and the Design of Post-
Grant Patent Reviews, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 14–16), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2601562 (noting other selection effects).
36 See FED. CIR. R. 36 (permitting entry of judgment without opinion).  The cases
decided with written opinion include Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,
793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2015), and In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  Only the
decision in Proxyconn was reversed.
37 The STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015), would change many aspects
of post-grant review, including the burden of proof on invalidity, the standard for claim
construction, and standing to petition for review.  The PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong.
(2015), was initially directed at other issues, but Section 11 of the current Manager’s
Amendment includes a section on PTAB procedures that would change the standard for
claim construction, broaden the grounds for amending claims, and alter other rules for
conducting post-grant opposition; the Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015), is simi-
lar.  The changes contemplated by the PTO are outlined in PTO Director Michelle K.
Lee’s blog. See Michelle K. Lee, PTAB’S Quick-Fixes for AIA Rules Are to Be Implemented Imme-
diately, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. (Mar. 27, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/
blog/director/entry/ptab_s_quick_fixes_for.  These include changing page limits, adjust-
ing motion practice (including for amending claims), permitting the introduction of more
evidence (including live testimony), allowing more discovery (especially on the question of
who is the real party in interest), and adding new rules to deal with multiple challenges to
the same patent.  See also Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Pat-
ent Trial and Appeal Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50720 (proposed Aug. 20, 2015) (to be codified
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
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to draw greater academic attention to the potential these procedures have
for changing the patent system and to provoke discussion—outside the
emerging PTAB bar—on how they ought to operate.  In particular, the stat-
ute layers inter partes review in a specialized agency under appellate review
in a specialized court.  I offer some thoughts on how authority over patent
jurisprudence should be allocated between these two centers of expertise.
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes the three procedures.
Part II evaluates use of the new system.  Part III discusses the interaction
between the PTAB and the Federal Circuit.  Part IV looks at the problems
these procedures raise for the parties, the adjudicators, and the sound
administration of patent law.
I. THE NEW PROCEDURES
The AIA provisions establishing the three new procedures, coupled with
the PTO’s regulations implementing them, create a complex procedural
landscape.  This Part describes the provisions and how they interact.
As noted above, Congress had many reasons to create new mechanisms
for challenging patents within the PTO.  First among them, however, were
cost and timing.38  The procedures Congress mandated and the regulations
adopted by the PTO reflect that priority.39  PGRs, IPRs, and CBMs are loosely
referred to by attorneys as “trials,” and are presided over by the PTAB using
many procedural safeguards.  But they are not the demonstrative spectacle of
the courtroom.  Instead, reviews are conducted in staggered fashion, accord-
ing to a strict time table, and with page and discovery limitations, preferably
on “paper” (in fact, electronic) filings.40  In theory, the parties are repre-
sented by individuals who practice before the PTO, although other attorneys
(such as litigators) can be admitted pro hac vice upon a showing of good
cause.41  The fees are relatively low but rise as more claims are challenged.42
The three proceedings have much in common.  Each begins with a peti-
tion to institute,43 to which the patent owner may file a preliminary response.
Once a petition is granted in whole or part,44 the panel and parties agree on
38 See Jonathan Tamimi, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolu-
tion of Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 591 (2014).
39 35 U.S.C. § 312 (2012) (giving the PTO authority to create rules); 37 C.F.R.
§§ 41–42 (2014).
40 For a fuller description, see Dunston & Hirschhorn, supra note 32, at 102–08; for a
detailed exposition, see Tamimi, supra note 38.
41 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(c) (2014).
42 Id. § 42.15.  For figures, see infra note 364.
43 See id. §§ 42.20–.80, 42.100–.123, 42.200–.224, 42.300–.304.
44 The PTAB’s decisions concerning institution can be reheard by the Board. Id.
§ 42.71.  However, they cannot be appealed directly to the Federal Circuit, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 314(d), 324(e), or set aside by a district court, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Lee, 793 F.3d
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  Whether they can be reviewed in conjunction with review of the
final written decision is unclear.  In In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, the Federal Circuit
denied review on an IPR challenge.  793 F.3d 1268, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  However, in
Versata, a CBM case, the Federal Circuit restyled the question as whether the PTAB
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how the proceedings will be conducted, usually through a telephone confer-
ence.  The parties then have a limited period in which to conduct discovery.
The patent owner can file a response to the petition, which can include a
motion to amend any claims found to be unpatentable; the petitioner can
then file a reply and an opposition to the motion to amend.  The next few
months provide the parties with opportunities to challenge evidence, file
observations, and request and engage in oral argument.  All in all, the proce-
dure, once instituted, should conclude in one year (although it can be
extended for six additional months).45  Given the tight time limits on pre-
institution activity, the entire process should, at most, take two years from
start to finish.
In considering the challenge to a claim, the statute requires the Board,
sitting in panels of three judges, to evaluate whether the petitioner sustained
the burden of proving that it is more probable than not that the claim is
invalid.46  This is identical to the burden the PTO bears in the examination
process.  Similar to examination, the regulations require the Board to give
unexpired claims their broadest reasonable interpretation.47  Because chal-
lenges can be brought only against individual patents, but many challenges
against a patent (or particular claims in it) can be mounted, the PTAB must
also consider whether proceedings should be joined and considered
together.48
Once the PTAB hands down a final written decision, the losing party
may appeal to the Federal Circuit.49  By statute, a disappointed patent holder
may also propose a reasonable number of amendments, but may not
broaden the scope of the patent.50  As interpreted by the PTO, each pro-
posed amendment must be a direct response to the successful challenge.51
After the time to appeal has expired or the appeal is terminated, the PTAB
exceeded its authority in calling the invention in question a covered business method and
then invalidating it.  793 F.3d at 1319–20.  Over a strong partial dissent by Judge Hughes,
id. at 1337–42, it then held it could decide whether the PTAB made the institution deci-
sion correctly.
45 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100–.200.
46 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e).  Section 18(a)(1) of the AIA mandates the use of PGR
standards and procedures for CBMs, with some exceptions.  Accordingly, the statutory pro-
vision for CBMs will not be cited separately unless the issue is within the exception.
47 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b), 42.300(b).
48 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 325(c); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.122, 42.222, 42.300.  The PTAB also has
discretion to refuse to institute if the petition relies on previously presented prior art or
arguments. See 35 U.S.C. § 325(d); Conopco, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. IPR2014-
00507 (P.T.A.B. July 7, 2014) (institution decision applying § 325(d) to IPR cases).  When
cases are joined, the Board will consider the challenges raised in each complaint, even if
they do not overlap. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics v. ISIS Innovation Ltd., No. IPR2012-
00022, at 20 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014).  All citations of PTAB decisions are to final written
decisions unless otherwise noted.
49 35 U.S.C. §§ 319, 329.
50 Id. §§ 316(d), 326(d).
51 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.121, 42.221, 42.300.  The PTAB has added other considerations. See
infra text accompanying notes 212–15. R
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issues a certificate in accordance with its findings (cancelling, confirming, or
amending each challenged claim).52  Settlements are possible, but any agree-
ment made in connection with the settlement must be filed with the PTO.
These can, however, be made confidential.53
Along the way, the parties must plead with considerable precision.  For
example, the petition to institute must identify the real parties in interest and
all administrative and judicial matters related to the proceedings,54 and
include a certification that the petitioner is not barred from bringing the
challenge, the precise relief requested for each claim challenged, the basis
for the challenge (including, according to the PTO, how the claim should be
construed), and citation of the evidence that supports the challenge.55  Peti-
tions and responses must also conform to strict page limits.56  Testimony and
cross-examination (which are time-limited) are submitted in the form of
exhibits (affidavits, transcripts of depositions);57 supplemental information
can be filed, but only within a narrow time frame or on a good-cause or
interests-of-justice standard.58
While the three new procedures have much in common, there are also
important distinctions.  Together, PGRs and IPRs are meant to provide a way
to challenge patents throughout their term, but the proceedings are sepa-
rately crafted to deal with right holders’ growing reliance interests.  CBMs are
different again: they are meant to help clear particularly questionable patents
from the system.
A. Post-Grant Review
The PGR is, in essence, the main response to the National Academies’
call to “weed out invalid patents or revise and narrow the claims.”59  Nomi-
nally, it is available only to challenge patents issued under the first-to-file pri-
ority rule, which was also instituted by the AIA.60  Thus, it applies to patents
issued on applications filed on or after March 16, 2013.61  However, because
the statute refers to patents that contain “a claim” with this effective filing
date,62 it is possible that PGRs can be brought to challenge claims in patents
52 35 U.S.C. §§ 318(b), 328(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.80.
53 35 U.S.C. §§ 317, 327; 37 C.F.R. § 42.74.
54 35 U.S.C. §§ 312, 322; 37 C.F.R. § 42.8 (b).
55 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.104, 42.204, 42.304.
56 Id. § 42.24 (limiting IPRs to 60 pages, PGRs and CBMs to 80, and motions, includ-
ing motions to amend, to 15).
57 Id. § 42.53.
58 Id. §§ 42.123, 42.223.
59 MERRILL ET AL., supra note 7, at 96.
60 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–03 (2012).
61 AIA §§ 6(d), (329)(f)(2)(A), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
62 See id. § 3(n)(1)(A).
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with earlier priority dates, so long as one claim that was not supported by the
original disclosure was added after that date.63
A petition for post-grant review may be filed by anyone who is not the
owner of the patent, has not (or whose real party in interest has not) already
filed a civil action challenging a claim in the patent, and is not estopped by a
prior action.64  It must be instituted within nine months of the grant of a
patent or the broadening reissuance of a patent previously granted.65  In
keeping with the notion that patents may be of low quality for many reasons,
including lack of novelty, obviousness, indefiniteness, inadequacy of a written
description, or failure to enable, the petitioner is permitted to raise any of
the grounds of invalidity denominated in the Patent Act as “defenses” to an
infringement action.66  And in keeping with this broad scope of challenge,
the scope of discovery is potentially liberal: notwithstanding the explicit lim-
its,67 additional discovery is available upon a showing of good cause.68  Dis-
covery is, however, limited to “evidence . . . related to factual assertions
advanced by either party.”69
The decision to institute a PGR requires the Board to determine
whether the petition presents information that “if [it] is not rebutted, would
demonstrate that it is more likely than not that at least [one] of the claims
challenged . . . is unpatentable.”70  Importantly, the Board can also institute
if the petition raises a “novel or unsettled legal question that is important to
other patents or patent applications,”71 for this allows the PTAB to consider
questions that will arise as the PTO implements the substantive provisions of
the AIA.  Once the determination to institute is made, other claims in the
patent can also be challenged.  While a petitioner cannot institute a PGR if it
has already instituted a civil action challenging validity,72 a civil action can be
63 See In re Choon’s Design Inc., No. PGR2014-00008 (petition filed Aug. 5, 2014)
(pending).
64 35 U.S.C. §§ 325 (a), (e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.201 (2014).
65 35 U.S.C. § 321(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.20.  Reissuances that are identical to or narrower
than the claims in the original patent cannot be challenged nine months after the original
patent issued.
66 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)).  This covers all statutory grounds of
unpatentability, including challenges to subject matter under § 101.  Versata Dev. Grp.,
Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  But it does not cover
common law grounds, such as double patenting. Cf. Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., LLC,
No. CBM2013-00021, at 25 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2013) (denying petition to institute and inter-
preting a similar provision for CBMs).
67 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (setting out mandatory initial disclosures and permitting the par-
ties to agree to additional discovery).
68 37 C.F.R. § 42.224(a).
69 Id. § 42.224(b).
70 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
71 Id. § 324(b); 37 C.F.R. § 42.208(d).
72 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(1).
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filed after the PGR is instituted.  In that case, the civil action is stayed until the
patent owner moves to lift the stay or files an infringement action.73
Although adverse decisions can be appealed to the Federal Circuit, once
a final written decision is handed down, the statute provides that the peti-
tioner, its privies, and real party in interest are estopped from raising before
the PTO, in a civil action, or in the ITC, an issue that was raised or reasonably
could have been raised in the PGR.74  Given the narrow window for bringing
PGRs and the limitations on discovery and argument, however, it is not clear
that Congress intended to extend estoppel to grounds that were not raised.
Because the “reasonably could have raised” language appears to have been a
drafting error, legislative efforts are being made to strike it.75  Arguably, how-
ever, estoppel plays an important role in protecting patent owners from har-
assment.76  As discussed more fully below, the impact of PGRs may depend
heavily on the fate of this provision—or on how reasonably “reasonably” is
interpreted and who are considered in privity with the challenger.  A final
written decision also estops the patent holder.  It cannot take “action incon-
sistent with the adverse judgment.”77  This includes obtaining a claim that is
the same as a claim that was cancelled or a proposed amendment that was
rejected.78
B. Inter Partes Review
To some extent, IPRs pick up where PGRs leave off: for first-to-file
claims, they can be instituted as soon as the date to file a PGR has passed.79
IPRs are, however, also available to challenge patents issued under the first-
to-invent system.  Since these are not subject to PGR review, a challenge can
be filed as soon as the patent is granted.80  As with PGRs, anyone who is not
the patent owner and is not already estopped may file one,81 but as before,
petitioners face a choice: no one who has filed a civil action challenging the
validity of a claim in the patent can then file an IPR.82  As with PGRs, there is
73 Id. § 325(a)(2).  In addition, PGRs can be instituted after validity is challenged in a
counterclaim. Id. § 325(a)(3).
74 Id. § 325(e); 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(1).
75 See Implementation of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary House of Representatives, 112th Cong. 60 (2012) (statement of Robert A. Armitage,
Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel of Eli Lilly and Co.); Matal, supra note 7, at 618.
76 See Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the America Invents Act
Revisited: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 33–37 (2013) (arguing that a
broader estoppel protects the judicial system as well as the patent holder).
77 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).
78 Id.
79 35 U.S.C. § 311(c); 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(1).  When it is possible to institute an IPR
after a PGR, the IPR can be instituted as soon as the PGR is terminated.  37 C.F.R.
§ 42.102(a)(3).
80 37 C.F.R. § 42.102(a)(2).
81 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(a), 315(e).
82 Id. § 315(a)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.101(a), (c).  Again, counterclaims for invalidity do
not count. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(3).
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a provision to stay court proceedings the petitioner files after filing an IPR.83
In addition, if the petitioner, his privy, or real party in interest has already
been served with a complaint alleging infringement, the IPR must be sought
within a year of service.84
IPRs are different from PGRs in one critical respect: claims can be chal-
lenged only on the grounds of novelty and nonobviousness, and then only if
the prior art constitutes a patent or a printed publication.85  The standard
for finding the claim unpatentable is the same as for PGRs, but the limit on
the grounds for invalidation means that the patent holder and its post-issu-
ance investment are exposed to invalidation on this standard only with
respect to issues that could not easily be determined soon after issuance (and
only with the use of materials that can be easily put into evidence).  There
are other subtleties.  Institution depends only on whether there is “a reasona-
ble likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least [one]
of the claims challenged in the petition,” taking into account the patent
owner’s preliminary response (if one is filed).86  There is no provision for
additional discovery on a good-cause standard, although it can be provided
in the interest of justice.87  While estoppel for the patent holder is the same
as for PGRs, the effect of preclusion is different for the petitioner.  As the
only grounds that can be raised in the IPR are novelty and nonobviousness
based on a narrow range of prior art, there are many grounds on which the
identical claims can be challenged in court or in the ITC.
C. Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods
CBMs were added to the AIA at the tail end of legislative deliberations,88
in the wake of several Supreme Court cases questioning the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of the scope of patentable subject matter and as NPE actions
emerged as a problem.89  As its formal name implies, the program is
83 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).
84 Id. § 315(b).  There is controversy over how this bar applies when the suit is dis-
missed, multiple suits are filed, or the infringement allegation is in a counterclaim. See
Tamimi, supra note 38, at 629–31.
85 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).  Note, however, that other issues, including § 101 challenges,
can arise in IPRs in connection with motions to amend because the panel will consider
whether the amended claim is patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics v.
ISIS Innovation Ltd., IPR2012-00022, at 51 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014).
86 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(c).
87 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5)(B); Garmin Int’l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Techs. LLC, No.
IPR2012-00001, at 6–7 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013). Garmin was a decision on a motion for
additional discovery, setting out a five-part test, which looks, among other things, at the
probability (not possibility) of gaining useful information and the burden in terms of time,
money, and human resources. Id. at 6–7.
88 Matal, supra note 7, at 628–32.
89 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S1053 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen.
Schumer).
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intended to sunset.90  Presumably, by September 16, 2020, anyone affected
by these questionable patents will have had time to challenge them.  As with
IPRs, claims in both first-to-file and first-to-invent patents can be challenged;
as with PGRs, the challenge can be on any of the grounds that are denomi-
nated defenses to an infringement action.91
CBMs can be brought any time in the life of the patent, but the patent
holder is arguably protected from harassment in that a petition may be insti-
tuted only if the petitioner, its real party in interest, or privy has been sued
for, or charged with, infringement and is not estopped by a prior action.92
Furthermore, only the holders of “covered business method patent[s]”93 are
vulnerable.  Presumably the patents whose validity is most questionable are
the ones most often asserted by NPEs.  These are defined as patents that
claim “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing
or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a
financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents
for technological inventions.”94  The PTO determines whether a patent is a
technological innovation by considering, on a case-by-case basis, “whether
the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is
novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using
a technical solution.”95  These limitations may appear to narrow the set of
challenges that can be considered.  Nevertheless, the PTAB has shown itself
willing to consider a fairly wide variety of cases.96  Furthermore, once it finds
one claim to be within the definition, the PTAB can consider challenges to
other claims in the patent.97
On the whole, the conduct of proceedings for CBMs mirrors that for
IPRs.98  However, because CBMs can mainly be brought in cases where litiga-
tion is pending or threatened, the procedures include a special provision on
90 AIA § 18(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (referring to CBMs as the
“transitional program for covered business methods patents”).
91 37 C.F.R. § 42.304(b)(1).  Despite the language, the Federal Circuit rejected an
argument that the PTAB cannot consider subject matter challenges under AIA § 101
because that provision is not mentioned in § 282(b) of the statute as a defense.  Versata
Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“It would require a
hyper-technical adherence to form rather than an understanding of substance to arrive at a
conclusion that § 101 is not a ground available to test patents under either the PGR or § 18
processes.”).
92 AIA § 18(a)(1)(B); 37 C.F.R. § 42.302.
93 37 C.F.R. § 42.301.
94 AIA § 18(d)(1); 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(a).
95 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b).
96 See infra text accompanying notes 150–151. R
97 See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir.  2015)
(“We accept the PTAB’s use of claim 17 as representative.”); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003, at 7 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014) (“Section
18(d)(1) of the AIA sets forth a single threshold based on just one claim—the satisfaction
of which qualifies an entire patent as eligible for review . . . .”).
98 See 37 C.F.R. § 42.300.
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stays of trial court actions.  According to the statute, trial courts must
determine
(A) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues in question
and streamline the trial;
(B) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set;
(C) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly prejudice the non-
moving party or present a clear tactical advantage for the moving party; and
(D) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of litigation
on the parties and on the court.99
There is a right to an immediate interlocutory appeal from the trial
court’s decision and this may be de novo to ensure consistent application.100
In its first decision involving this provision, VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com,
Inc., the Federal Circuit reversed the denial of a stay, criticized the trial court
for reviewing the PTAB’s determination that it was more likely than not that
one claim was not patentable, and stressed the need to consider whether the
stay would simplify the issues and streamline the trial.101
Unlike PGRs and IPRs, the estoppel provision for CBMs is narrow.
Upon issuance of a final written decision, the petitioner or its real party in
interest may not later assert invalidity on any ground raised—not any ground
that reasonably could have been raised—during the proceeding.102  The
estoppel applies to district court and ITC proceedings, but the statute makes
no mention of subsequent proceedings in the PTO.  Nor does it mention the
petitioner’s privies.
II. USE OF THE PROCEDURES
In a sense, the numbers speak volumes.  Despite the fears that the estop-
pel provision or collective-action problems would discourage use of these
procedures, IPRs and CBMs have proven extremely popular.  The number of
petitions is impressive.  Near the two-year mark, the statistics were as follows:
99 AIA § 18(b)(1).
100 Id. § 18(b)(2).
101 VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
also Benefit Funding Sys. LLC v. Advance Am. Cash Advance Ctrs. Inc., 767 F.3d 1383 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) (using the provision to affirm the granting of a stay).  The Federal Circuit also
reversed a decision denying a stay in Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 771 F.3d
1368 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  Interestingly, the parties then settled and the decision was vacated.
Versata Software, Inc. v. Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
102 AIA § 18(a)(1)(D).
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TABLE 1 NUMBER OF AIA PETITIONS (AS OF 9/11/14)103
FY Total IPR CBM PGR 
2012 25 17 8 - 
2013 563 514 48 - 
2014 1,406 1,240 159 2 
Cumulative 1,994 1,771 215 1 
Even more revealing than the number of cases have been the disposi-
tions.  Initially, around 85% of the claims challenged in an instituted IPR
were cancelled; that figure was 100% for CBMs.104  While these rates appear
to be dropping for IPRs,105 a study by Brian Love and Shawn Ambwani shows
that over the first two years, petitioners were extremely successful:
• The PTAB grants—or “institutes”—IPR petitions for at least one chal-
lenged claim 84 percent of the time;
• Among instituted IPRs, all challenged claims are instituted 74 percent of
the time;
• Among IPRs that reach a final decision on the merits, all instituted claims
are invalidated or disclaimed more than 77 percent of the time.106
103 PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., AIA PROGRESS STATISTICS (AS OF 9/11/14) 1 (2014),
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/aia_statistics_091114.pdf.  The PTO did not
provide numbers for the two-year mark (September 16, 2014).  However, the fiscal year
runs from October 1 through September 30 and numbers were published for fiscal year
2014.  They show that by September 30, 2014, seventy more IPRs and eighteen more CBMs
had been filed.
104 See Cyrus A. Morton & David A. Prange, Is the PTAB a Death Sentence for Patent Rights?,
ROBINS KAPLAN LLP (June 19, 2014), http://www.rkmc.com/resources/articles/is-the-
ptab-a-death-sentence-for-patent-rights.  Morton and Prangle note that
Through May 2014 . . . :
• In the PTAB’s first 67 final written decisions, only 9 of the patents submit-
ted for review have emerged unscathed.
• Out of the 1,093 claims addressed by those 67 decisions, only 231 claims
survived, resulting in a survival rate of about 21 percent.
• Patent owners have also been largely unsuccessful in trying to introduce
claim amendments.  In 24 motions to amend, only one has been successful
(and the successful patent owner was the United States government).
Id.
105 See generally Tony Dutra, America Invents Act Post-Grant Oppositions After Two Years:
Benefit or ‘Death Squad’?, BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Sept. 19, 2014; see also
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REVIEW PETITIONS TERMINATED TO DATE (AS
OF 9/4/2014) (2014),  http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/inter_partes_review_
petitions_terminated_update_20140904.pdf (suggesting that as of September 4, 2014, only
12% of all claims challenged in an IPR were cancelled); Daniel F. Klodowski, Claim and
Case Disposition, FINNEGAN, http://www.aiablog.com/claim-and-case-disposition/ (showing
that as of August 1, 2015, 74.49% of claims on which an IPR was instituted were cancelled
and that 94.89% of the claims on which CBMs were instituted were cancelled).
106 Love and Ambwani, supra note 2, at 94.
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Not surprisingly, over time, the number of settlements has increased.  By
close to the two-year mark, the figures were as follows:
TABLE 2 AIA TRIALS INSTITUTED/DISPOSALS (AS OF 9/11/14)107
  Trials  Instituted Joinders Denials 
Total  
Decisions 
Instituted 
Disposals
Settled FWD* RAJ 
** 
Other 
*** 
I 
P 
R 
F 
Y 
1 
3 
167 10* 26 203 38 - 2 1 
F 
Y 
1 
4 
509 15* 167 691 165 114 35 1 
C 
B 
M 
F 
Y 
1 
3 
14 - 3 17 3 1 - - 
F 
Y 
1 
4 
74 1* 25 100 26 11 1 2 
*  Final Written Decisions on the merits.
**  Judgments based on Request for Adverse Judgment.
*** Includes terminations due to dismissal.108
While these statistics speak loudly about the public’s eagerness and abil-
ity to use these procedures to “weed out” bad patents, it is more difficult to
interpret what the numbers mean from a normative standpoint.  To some,
they suggest that the Board is out of control.  As Randall Rader, once chief
judge of the Federal Circuit, put it, the judges of the PTAB are “acting as
death squads, killing property rights.”109  Or in the words of two bloggers,
107 See PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., supra note 103.  By the end of fiscal year 2014, the
number of IPR settlements increased by forty-five; there was one additional CBM
settlement. See also Carlson & Migliorini, supra note 2, at 106 (suggesting that the
invalidation rate in the new proceedings is much higher than in the reexamination
proceedings that these new procedures augment (citing Joseph D. Cohen, What’s Really
Happening in Inter Partes Reexamination, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 207, 217
(2005))).
108 It is somewhat difficult to determine the number of settlements from the PTO
figures because some cases that settled are marked “no institution” on the PTAB Portal.
See, e.g., Oracle Corp. v. Cmty. United IP, LLC, No. CBM2013-00015 (P.T.A.B. July 25,
2013) (termination of proceeding).
109 Tony Dutra, Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill,
BNA PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, Oct. 29, 2013.
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the PTAB is “where patent claims go to die.”110  More temperately, after com-
paring cancellation rates in IPRs to invalidation rates in court and consider-
ing the number of claims cancelled in IPRs that had previously survived ex
parte reexamination,111 Gregory Dolin concluded that it is “too easy to invali-
date a duly issued patent” in an IPR.  He called the CBM statistics “even more
staggering.”112
But the numbers can be understood in a very different way.  Before the
PTAB can issue a final written decision cancelling claims, it must decide
whether to institute a proceeding.  The standard for determining whether to
institute, although slightly different for the three procedures, is essentially
whether it is more probable than not that at least one challenged claim is
unpatentable.  Since the preponderance of the evidence standard for deter-
mining whether a claim should be cancelled is also, essentially, whether it is
more probable than not invalid, the high invalidation rate is basically a reflec-
tion of the PTAB’s ability to forecast correctly how it will decide on at least
one claim.  Because the panel that decides whether to institute also decides
the case on the merits, a strong correlation is to be expected.113  This is espe-
cially so because the institution decisions are far from pro forma: they are
often as long as the merits decision, cover the same issues (claim construc-
tion is often central), and are as thoughtful and probing of the arguments as
the decisions on the merits.114  Admittedly, once the PTAB decides one
claim may be invalid, it can entertain challenges to other claims as well.  But
it need not hear every claim the petitioner seeks to cancel.  Partial institutions
are possible, and in practice, the PTAB screens out claims that appear to be
valid at the institution stage.  That is, in deciding whether to institute, the
110 Michelle Carniaux & Michael E. Sander, Claims Can Survive Inter Partes and Covered
Business Method Review (But Few Do), IPR BLOG (Apr. 7, 2014), http://interpartesreview-
blog.com/claims-can-survive-inter-partes-covered-business-method-review/.
111 See Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 926–27 (2015) (citing
John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26
AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998)); Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the
Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6–7 (2013).
112 Dolin, supra note 111, at 926, 930.
113 The PTO is considering a pilot program in which institution decisions would be
made by only one judge; if that judge decides to institute, two new judges would be added
to decide the case. See Lee, supra note 37.  Such a procedure would benefit from con-
tinuity and also give a greater appearance of impartiality; it will be interesting to see if it
leads to a lower rate of cancellation.
114 To take two examples, arbitrarily chosen, the institution decision in SAP America,
Inc. v. Versata Development Group, Inc. was forty-four pages long.  No. CBM2012-00001
(P.T.A.B. Jan. 9, 2013) (institution decision).  In the same case, the final written decision
was thirty-five pages. Id. (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013).  The institution decision in U.S. Bancorp
v. Retirement Capital Access Mgmt. Co. was fifteen pages.  No. CBM2013-00014 (P.T.A.B. Sept.
20, 2013) (institution decision).  There, the final written decision was twenty-one pages.
Id. (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014).
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PTAB often considers every claim and every ground to determine whether
each claim is more likely than not unpatentable on each alleged ground.115
Along the same lines, CBMs cannot be instituted if the claim as a whole
is drawn to a “technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the
prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.”116
Because many business-method claims involve fairly abstract ideas tied only to
a general-purpose computer, and, per the Supreme Court, can only be con-
sidered patentable subject matter if they contain an “inventive concept,”117
the “technical solution” requirement, although not the same as the “inven-
tive concept” test, will filter out some subject-matter challenges that would be
losers on the merits.118
It is also important to keep in mind that the claims challenged are not
always independent of one another.  Depending on their relationship and
the grounds considered, cancellation of some claims may be highly likely to
lead to the cancellation of others.119  For example, a newly revealed piece of
115 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a) (2014); id. § 42.208 (permitting the Board to institute on only
some claims and to refuse to consider all asserted grounds for invalidation); id. § 42.300;
see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. CBM2014-00031 (P.T.A.B.
Aug. 18, 2014) (institution decision) (instituting on nine of eighteen claims challenged).
The PTAB then granted the patent holder’s motion for adverse judgment on all chal-
lenged claims.
116 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b).  The Federal Circuit agreed with the regulation’s implemen-
tation of the statute.  Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
117 See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (citing Mayo Collabo-
rative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012)).
118 See, e.g., Metavante Corp. v. Checkfree Corp., No. CBM2013-00031 (P.T.A.B. Dec.
23, 2013) (institution decision using similar criteria to decide whether the invention is a
covered business method and whether the claims are more likely than not drawn to invalid
subject matter and claims that include sufficient elements to avoid institution); see also
Versata, 793 F.3d at 1326–27 (considering whether the challenged claim was technological
in nature).
119 Dolin gives the example of seven cases, which all involved the same family of pat-
ents, where the challenges arguably “rose and fell together.”  Dolin, supra note 111, at 930
(citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00004 (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 13, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00010
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-
00002 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No.
CBM2013-00009 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.,
No. CBM2012-00003 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins.
Co., No. CBM2012-00004 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015); Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00002 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 23, 2014)).  These dis-
putes all involved Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s challenge to a set of patents owned
by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company; the PTAB decisions were all affirmed in a
single nonprecedential opinion.  Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No.
2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).  CBM2013-00002 alone involved
fifty-nine claims, fifty-six of which were cancelled on non-obviousness grounds and the
other three of which were voluntarily cancelled.  Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas.
Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00002, at 1–2 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014).
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prior art that anticipates a dependent claim is likely to anticipate the inde-
pendent claim on which it depends and other dependent claims as well.120
Once a claim or a facet of prior art is interpreted in a particular way, the
interpretation can have an adverse impact on an entire family of patents.121
Additionally, multiple parties can file challenges to the same claims.122  This
practice inflates the cancellation rate.  It may also be abusive.  That issue is
discussed in Part IV.123
It is also misleading to compare the outcome of litigation with the results
of PTAB review.  The preponderance standard for determining invalidity in
PTAB challenges, which is statutorily mandated, can easily lead to the cancel-
lation of claims that Rader, as a Federal Circuit judge applying a clear and
convincing standard, would have upheld and which may, indeed, have been
previously upheld by district courts.124  As important is the difference in the
approach to claim interpretation.  The PTAB gives unexpired patent claims
their broadest reasonable interpretation; in court, they are given their ordi-
nary customary meaning, which is generally narrower.125  The broader the
claim, the more likely the challenger can find prior art to invalidate it on
novelty or obviousness grounds,126 the more abstract it is likely to read,127
120 Cf. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
the relationship between dependent and independent claims).
121 See, e.g., Micron Tech., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. IPR2013-00005
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2014) (determining obviousness of a product-by-process claim by the
characteristics of the product without regard to the process, and then using the same prior
art to invalidate eight different claims related to one patent), aff’d, Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ill. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 596 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
122 See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, No. IPR2014-00977, at 2
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2014) (decision denying joinder and denying institution of IPR review;
original petition filed June 18, 2014, challenging the same claims asserted by EMC on Pat.
No. 6,415,280); EMC Corp. v. PersonalWeb Techs., LLC, No. IPR2013-00083 (P.T.A.B. May
15, 2014) (invalidating claims 36 and 38 of Pat. No. 6,415,280).
123 But see Benjamin and Rai, supra note 19, at 326–27 (suggesting that allowing multi-
ple challenges can reduce the collective action problem).
124 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, at 18
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013) (refusing to adopt district court’s claim construction and then
finding claims unpatentable as abstract), aff’d, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793
F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Interthinx, Inc. v. CoreLogic Sols., LLC, No. CBM2012-00007,
at 6 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2014) (holding that prior adjudication does not estop challenger
because the different standards mean that the issues are not the same in litigation and
administrative adjudication), appeal dismissed sub nom., In re CoreLogic Sols., LLC, 571 F.
App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014).  The problem is further discussed infra, text accompanying
notes 296–304. R
125 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that
“the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would
have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as
of the effective filing date of the patent application”).
126 See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00004, at 34
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2014) (holding that because the claim was interpreted to include
processed data and not just raw data, prior art disclosing processed data invalidated the
claim), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL
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and the less likely it is to be fully supported by the written description, ade-
quately enabled, and distinctly claimed.128
Most important from a normative perspective is that many claims
deserve to die.  Dolin makes much of the fact that 15% of the claims can-
celled in an IPR had survived a challenge in ex parte reexamination.129
Because he fails to say which IPRs these are, it is impossible to know for sure
what happened, but it is worth noting that ex parte reexaminations, like ini-
tial examination, are ex parte—that is, without an opportunity for a chal-
lenger to respond to the patent holder’s arguments.  Inter partes review
corrects the asymmetry between the patent holder’s and the patent office’s
knowledge of the field and the invention; the greater number of invalida-
tions in CBMs and IPRs can be read as affirming the suspicion that ex parte
procedures are not fully effective at flushing out bad claims.
More to the point, Dolin’s reexaminations may have preceded the
Supreme Court’s articulation of the concern that Federal Circuit jurispru-
dence was producing patents that “impede rather than ‘promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts.’”130  In the years following this statement by
Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reworked the law on many key issues of
patentability.  In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,131 the question was non-
obviousness, which requires the invention to be beyond the grasp of a person
with ordinary skill in the art.132  The Federal Circuit had imposed a require-
ment that the challenger show a “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” to
combine prior art references.133  But the Supreme Court rejected the
“errors” of the Federal Circuit and its “rigid” rule.  It stressed that “a person
of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton,”134
that “[t]he obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic concep-
tion of the words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis
5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015); Intellectual Ventures Mgmt., LLC v. Xilinx, Inc., No.
IPR2012-00018 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2014) (noting that the determination of obviousness
turned on the definition of “inside”).
127 See, e.g., Fidelity Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. Cashedge, Inc., No. CBM2013-00028
(P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2013) (institution decision deciding whether the claims are drawn to
patentable subject matter premised on a reading of claim that reads out its nonabstract
elements).
128 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, No. CBM2013-00013, at 11
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2014) (construing the term “routed transactional data structure” in a
manner that leads to a determination of indefiniteness).  The breadth of the claim may
also determine whether an institution decision is made. See Petition for Post-Grant Review
of U.S. Patent No. 8,684,420, LaRose Indus., LLC v. Choon’s Design, Inc., No. PGR2014-
00008 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2015); supra note 63.  The propriety of using this standard is dis-
cussed infra, text accompanying notes 216–27.
129 Dolin, supra note 111, at 927.
130 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
131 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
132 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
133 See KSR, 550 U.S. at 399.
134 Id. at 421.
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on the importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued
patents,”135 that “it often may be the case that market demand, rather than
scientific literature, will drive design trends,”136 and that persons of ordinary
skill in the art will repurpose solutions to one problem in order to solve a
different problem.
By the same token, in a series of four cases, beginning with Bilski v. Kap-
pos and ending with Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank,137 the Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s view that any invention that produces a useful, concrete, and tangi-
ble result is drawn to patentable subject matter, as well as its rule that any
invention that constitutes a machine or effectuates a physical transformation
is statutory subject matter.  Instead, the Court emphasized that laws of
nature, phenomena of nature, and abstract ideas are not patentable
(although abstract claims can be “saved” if they include an “inventive con-
cept”).138  And in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., the Supreme Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule that a claim is valid so long as it is not
“insolubly ambiguous”; under the Court’s test, a “patent’s claims, [when]
viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history, [must] inform
those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with reasonable
certainty.”139
Given the fundamental nature of these changes to patent law, it is not
surprising that the PTAB would institute review and then invalidate many
claims issued, reexamined, or litigated before these cases were handed down.
Indeed, the technological distribution of the cases subject to review is
suggestive:
135 Id. at 419.
136 Id.
137 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
138 Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at
1294).
139 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014).  There are
questions as to whether the standard for indefiniteness used in a court challenge is the
same as the one that applies pre-issuance and, if so, which standard applies to post-grant
opposition procedures. See Erika H. Arner et al., Section 112(b) and the PTAB: Is the Legal
Standard for Indefiniteness Itself Indefinite?, 90 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 2335
(2015).  As noted in connection with the standard for claim construction, efficiency will be
vastly improved if the same standard were applied throughout. See infra text accompanying
notes 215–14.  Given the notice function of definiteness, it is particularly difficult to see R
why different standards should be used.
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TABLE 3 AIA PETITION TECHNOLOGY BREAKDOWN (AS OF 9/11/14)140
Technology Number of Petitions Percentage 
Electrical/Computer 1,432 71.8% 
Mechanical 308 15.5% 
Chemical 134 6.7% 
Bio/Pharma 112 5.6% 
Design 8 0.4% 
The vast majority of the cases are in the electrical/computer sector,
where the rejection of the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” and the
“machine or transformation” tests are most significant, and in mechanicals,
the field of the invention in KSR (and arguably, Nautilus).  The decisions
themselves rely heavily on the recent Supreme Court cases.  It is also note-
worthy that in a 2013 study, Shawn Miller showed that as with the PTAB,
courts are more likely to invalidate patents in the areas directly affected by
KSR and Bilski.141  Furthermore, the cancellation rate is comparable to the
findings of a 2014 German study, where researchers estimated that around
75% of German patents are at least partially invalid.142
Selection effects must also be considered.  Unauthorized users have
three shots at retaining freedom to operate: it is possible that the patent
holder will fail to sue; that if the patent holder does sue, the patent will be
invalidated; or that in the suit, the user’s activity will be found noninfringing.
At the PTAB, there is only one possibility: invalidation.143  Accordingly, chal-
lengers are likely to use these proceedings only when the case for invalidity is
extremely strong.  Table 2, which shows a fairly high number of cases in
which the patent holder requested an adverse judgment,144 supports the
notion that in the mix of losses are many claims that even the patent holder
understood to be defective.  Finally, it is not insignificant that, as with the
cancellation rate, the percentage of cases in which the PTAB has decided to
institute proceedings appears to be declining.145  This suggests that petition-
140 PATENT TRIAL & APPEAL BD., supra note 103.
141 Miller, supra note 111, at 35–36, 44.
142 Joachim Henkel & Hans Zischka, Why Most Patents are Invalid—Extent, Reasons,
and Potential Remedies of Patent Invalidity (Aug. 7, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Henkel_Joachim_IPSC_paper_2014_20140813.pdf. See
also Chien & Helmers, supra note 35, at 5 (noting that the invalidation percentage in the
European Patent Office is 68% and in German revocation proceedings, 75%).
143 See, e.g., John R. Allison et al., Our Divided Patent System, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073
(2015) (showing that patent holders’ rather low “definitive win rate” in court is due to a
combination of invalidation and noninfringement findings).
144 By the end of fiscal year 2014, there was one additional request for an adverse judg-
ment in a CBM and four in an IPR.
145 Scott McKeown calculated a very high institution rate as of July 17, 2014.  Scott A.
McKeown, PTAB Dials Back Petitioner Success Rate, PATENTS POST-GRANT (July 17, 2014),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/ptab-dials-back-patent-challenger-success-rate.  By Sep-
tember 11, 2014, the PTO’s statistics suggest the rate had fallen. See Joseph Casino &
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 24  8-DEC-15 16:57
258 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
ers may have saved claims that were clearly invalid for the onset of these new
procedures.
III. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PTAB AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
If it continues, the eagerness with which the new procedures have been
embraced suggests that those who proposed these mechanisms were right:
there are many advantages to channeling patent validity challenges back to
the PTO.  However, the ultimate success of the system depends heavily on the
Federal Circuit’s approach to reviewing PTAB decisions.  This Part elaborates
on the benefits and on their viability once the Federal Circuit begins to see
more of these cases.  But even if all potential benefits are realized, the proce-
dures have significant costs.  With three types of review, the system is com-
plex and use of the procedures is not exactly cheap.  Their two-year potential
duration is less than the length of district court litigation, but there is no
right to an expedited appeal.  Accordingly, the total period of uncertainty
could be almost as long as it is for litigation.  These matters are discussed in
Part IV.
A. Potential Benefits
The numbers reviewed in the previous Part demonstrate how effectively
the PTAB is clearing questionable claims from the system.  The potential
impact is evident: these procedures can promote freedom to operate, facili-
tate settlement, lower the incidence of litigation, and curb NPE practice.
With a workable procedure for issuing stays, they could also streamline litiga-
tion and make what goes on in the courtroom more efficient.146  Moreover,
Michael Kasdan, Trends from 2 Years of AIA Post-Grant Proceedings, LAW360 (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/581512/trends-from-2-years-of-aia-post-grant-proceed-
ings; cf. Michael Fuller, The PTAB May Be Taking a More Balanced Approach in Biotech and
Pharmaceutical IPRs, KNOBBE MARTENS (Mar. 23, 2015) http://knobbe.com/news/2015/
03/ptab-may-be-taking-more-balanced-approach-biotech-and-pharmaceutical-iprs-bloom-
berg-bna (noting a 75% institution rate for fiscal year 2015).  Still, it was high during the
period of examination (82% overall for IPRs as of September 3, 2014, and 80% for CBMs
as of that date). See PTO Trials, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Sept. 3, 2014), http://ptotri-
als.sidley.com/.  It is important to note that the institution rate is hard to calculate because
only some claims in a given petition may be subjected to scrutiny and there are sometimes
multiple petitions directed at the same claims.  Note also that PTAB’s categorization of the
cases can be unclear. See supra text accompanying note 108; see also Zetec, Inc. v. Westing- R
house Elec. Co., No. IPR 2014-00384 (P.T.A.B. July 23, 2014) (institution decision refusing
to institute because arguments were undeveloped).
146 While the hard line on stays taken in VirtualAgility, a CBM case, is not directly appli-
cable to IPRs and PGRs, the Federal Circuit stressed the possibility that PTAB considera-
tion would simplify trial.  VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1314
(Fed. Cir. 2014).  As the text below makes clear, however, presently, the multiplicity of
these procedures can make it difficult for a trial court to determine the exact contours of a
case or know when to dissolve stays and proceed to trial. See infra text accompanying notes
287–288, 306; see also, e.g., Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, R
2015 WL 2248437 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015) (initially refusing to stay litigation for an IPR,
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as Joseph Casino and Michael Kasdan have noted, “[t]he PTAB runs a tight
ship.”147  Discovery has been kept to a minimum and the PTAB has managed
to keep within the time limits mandated.  Indeed, Love and Ambwani found
that the average pendency of IPR petitions within the PTAB is fifteen
months.148  Given the three years it can take to try a patent case in popular
jurisdictions, speed can be an important benefit to using these
proceedings.149
As proponents hoped, the Board has taken its duty to protect the public
interest seriously.  Thus, it has adopted a broad understanding of what consti-
tutes a “financial product” within the meaning of the transitional business
method program150 and what it means to be the object of an assertion in a
CBM.151  At the same time, it has interpreted the limits on filing IPRs nar-
rowly,152 taken a dim view of theories of assignor estoppel,153 and adopted a
skeptical approach to arguments that a claim is within the “technological
innovation” exception to CBMs.154  Many cases involve challenges to patents
held by aggregators,155 suggesting that the proceedings may have an impact
leading to a $44 million judgment, which was finally stayed when the PTAB invalidated the
relevant claims), aff’d sub nom., Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 611 F. App’x 720 (Fed.
Cir. 2015).
147 Joseph Casino & Michael Kasdan, Lessons from 2 Years of AIA Post-Grant Proceedings,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2014, 10:18 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/581513/lessons-
from-2-years-of-aia-post-grant-proceedings.
148 Love & Ambwani, supra note 2, at 99. R
149 Casino & Kasdan, supra note 145.
150 See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(“We agree with the USPTO that, as a matter of statutory construction, the definition of
‘covered business method patent’ is not limited to products and services of only the finan-
cial industry, or to patents owned by or directly affecting the activities of financial institu-
tions such as banks and brokerage houses.”).  For examples of the liberal view, see
Salesforce.com, Inc. v. VirtualAgility, Inc., No. CBM2013-00024, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 16, 2014)
(illustrating a patent on a method of managing collaborative activity that can include
financial aspects of an organization), and Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Technologies, LLC, No.
CBM2013-00020, at 11–15 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2013) (institution decision concerning a
method of distributing digital signals).
151 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Pi-Net Int’l, Inc., No. IPR2013-00195 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 19,
2013) (institution decision).
152 See, e.g., Ariosa Diagnostics v. ISIS Innovation, Ltd., No. IPR2012-00022, at 14–16
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 315 as, among other things, permitting a
party that had brought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and—in response to a
counterclaim of infringement—added a claim of invalidity to nonetheless maintain an
IPR).
153 See, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. IPR2012-00042, at 17
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2014).
154 See, e.g., Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLC, No. CBM2013-00033 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19,
2013) (institution decision); SAP Am., Inc. v. Pi-Net Int’l, Inc., CBM2013-00013, at 18–19
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 19, 2013) (institution decision).
155 Indeed, a disproportionate number of IPR settlements involve patents held by
NPEs. See Scott A. McKeown, Settlement Stats Show Trolls Fleeing PTAB Patent Challenges, PAT-
ENTS POST-GRANT (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/settlement-stats-show-
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on that practice and decrease the tax it is said to impose on innovation.  Fur-
thermore, the PTAB has allowed interested parties who may lack standing in
court—suppliers are an example—to bring IPRs.156  Interestingly, although
the settlement rate has increased, the PTAB does not always terminate pro-
ceedings after the parties settle.  Instead, it sometimes retains authority to
issue a final written decision cancelling challenged claims.157  Indeed, for
strategic reasons (such as to avoid other invalidations), some patent holders
have simply requested adverse judgment once review was instituted.158
Most important, because the PTAB applies patentability criteria using
the preponderance of the evidence standard for invalidation and the
broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims, its decisions do what the
examiners would have done had they had the PTAB’s extra time, resources,
and expertise, and had they understood the law as enunciated in recent
Supreme Court interventions.  Application of the law nunc pro tunc goes a
longer way than litigation can towards safeguarding the public’s interest in
the free availability of technology that should not be privately controlled.159
npes-fleeing-ptab-patent-challenge-proceedings (depicting that 75% of all 2013 IPR settle-
ments involved NPEs); see also, e.g., Bank of Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, No.
CBM2014-00029 (P.T.A.B. May 19, 2015); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ventures II
LLC, No. CBM2014-00031 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 18, 2014); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ven-
tures I LLC, No. CBM2014-00028 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) (institution decision); Bank of
Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ventures I LLC, No. CBM2014-00030 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014)
(institution decision); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Intellectual Ventures II LLC, No. CBM2014-
00033 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) (institution decision); PNC Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Intellec-
tual Ventures I LLC, No. CBM2014-00032 (P.T.A.B. May 22, 2014) (institution decision);
Sony Corp. v. Tessera, Inc., No. IPR2012-00033 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 26, 2013) (institution deci-
sion); see also Love & Ambwani, supra note 2, at 94 (finding that institution rates for NPE-
owned patents are higher than for other patents, although invalidation rates are lower).
156 See, e.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. MCM Portfolio, LLC, No. IPR2013-00217 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 10, 2013); see also Microsoft Corp. v. DataTern, Inc., 755 F.3d 899, 904 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“To the extent that Appellees argue that they have a right to bring the declaratory
judgment action solely because their customers have been sued for direct infringement,
they are incorrect.”).  Standing to appeal is discussed infra, text accompanying notes
368–394. R
157 See, e.g., Interthinx, Inc. v. CoreLogic Sols., LLC, No. CBM2012-00007 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
30, 2014), appeal dismissed sub nom., In re CoreLogic Sols., LLC, 571 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
158 See, e.g., Google, Inc. v. Inventor Holdings, LLC, No. CBM2014-00003 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 12, 2014) (grant of adverse judgment).
159 In her dissent in Cuozzo, Judge Newman argued that the PTAB was meant to serve as
a “surrogate for district court litigation.” In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268,
1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting); see also In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793
F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Prost, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
However, the statutory requirement that the PTAB apply the preponderance of the evi-
dence rule suggests that providing a substitute, cheaper, route to litigation was not Con-
gress’s sole concern.
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In the future, fear of the “death squads” (or, an efficient PTAB) may discour-
age patent prosecutors from drafting abstract or overly broad claims.160
My reading of the cases suggests many more subtle ways in which the
invigoration of patent review within the PTO could contribute meaningfully
to patent jurisprudence and the administration of patent law.  Like the BPAI
it replaced, the PTAB is not bound by the Manual of Patent Examining Pro-
cedure or PTO Guidelines and thus it brings an independent analysis to bear
on patentability questions.161  As noted earlier, the PTAB is staffed with
experienced patent lawyers and each panel is meant to include someone with
close knowledge of the field of the invention.162  The institution and final
decisions reflect this expertise.  The Board’s opinions are extremely well writ-
ten and closely reasoned; their fluidity suggests deep immersion in both the
technical facts of the cases and the law to be applied.  In short, the Board is
well-structured to add an important new voice to the development of patent
jurisprudence.
Most obviously, the PTAB’s expertise can be exploited in a “preview”
capacity.  Many of the cases coming before the Board raise questions about
implementing recent Supreme Court decisions.  Consider, for example, defi-
niteness.  When the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s “insolubly
ambiguous” standard, it did not spell out exactly what it meant for a claim to
be “precise enough to afford clear notice of what is claimed” while “tak[ing]
into account the inherent limitations of language.”163  The Federal Circuit’s
attempt to anticipate Nautilus was a failure164 and in the immediate after-
math, it considered the issue only twice, rather briefly.165  Notably, oral argu-
ment in the remand of Nautilus suggested the court was having a very
difficult time coming up with a workable approach;166 ultimately, it basically
reinstated its earlier opinion.167  In contrast, the PTAB started citing the
decision three weeks after it issued.168  Repeated exposure to definiteness
160 See, e.g., Shana K. Cyr et al., Preparing Pharma for Generics’ IPR Attacks, 88 PAT. TRADE-
MARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1220, 1221 (2014) (suggesting better prosecution to stave off
challenges).
161 See, e.g., Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *15 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006); In re Santarsiero, No. 105,403, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1271, 1276 n.6 (B.P.A.I. May 31,
2006).
162 In addition, paralegal specialists are assigned to specific subject matter.  To date,
however, hiring has not depended on expertise in the subject matter and the staff has been
underused. See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REVIEW OF WASTE AND MISMANAGEMENT AT THE
PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 11 (2014).
163 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128–29 (2014).
164 See In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
165 Interval Licensing LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (find-
ing the claim indefinite); Augme Techs., Inc. v. Yahoo! Inc., 755 F.3d 1326, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2014). Nautilus was decided on June 2, 2014.  134 S. Ct. 2120.
166 See Tony Dutra, Fed. Cir. Oral Argument Seeks More Precision on ‘Vague’ Patent Indefinite-
ness Standard, 88 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1681, 1681–82 (2014).
167 Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 783 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
168 LaRose Indus., LLC v. Capriola Corp., No. IPR2013-00120, at 30–31 (P.T.A.B. June
26, 2014) (using the principle to interpret a claim).
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problems in CBMs (and eventually in PGRs) is leading to the development of
nuanced and context-specific standards.  For example, in SAP America, Inc. v.
Lakshmi Arunachalam, decided three months after Nautilus, the claims cov-
ered a method and apparatus for providing real-time, two-way transactions on
the web.169  To determine whether the term “routed transactional data struc-
ture” was indefinite, the Board engaged in a technical analysis of the specifi-
cation’s teachings concerning how objects were transmitted over the network
and focused considerable attention to the question of what a person of ordi-
nary skill would understand, and in particular, whether a proprietary proto-
col referenced in the patent disclosed sufficient information to inform such a
person of the scope of the claim.170  While there is some uncertainty as to
whether the PTAB should apply the same standard on this issue as courts,
PTAB cases can still furnish something of a blueprint for deciding definite-
ness issues, particularly in the Internet arena, where sharper claims could
help alleviate the trolling problem.171
Similarly, the law laid out in the four Supreme Court cases on patentable
subject matter is hard to understand, especially with regard to the meaning
of “conventional steps” and “inventive concept.”  Yet the PTAB rendered
decisions based on Alice within a few months of the decision.172  In these
cases, the Board set out an analytical framework and did so in specific fields,
such as the interactive web applications mentioned above.173  Several deci-
sions offer a methodology for thinking about what counts as a general pur-
pose computer,174 what constitutes more than a “conventional step” in the
use of a general-purpose computer, and a way to consider abstractness in the
context of computer implementation, including (as some commentators
have suggested) by reference to what humans could accomplish on their
own.175  The PTAB tends to begin with a careful construction of the chal-
lenged claims; in contrast, the Federal Circuit has shown a willingness to dis-
169 No. CBM2013-00013, at 3 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2014).
170 Id. at 18–20.
171 See Arner et al., supra note 139.  Construction of means-plus-function claiming has
also created many interpretive difficulties. See Mark D. Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional
Claims?  Reforming the Patent Law’s § 112, ¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 281 (1999).  The PTAB approach may similarly be helpful to courts
struggling with the issue. See, e.g., Blackberry Corp. v. MobileMedia Ideas LLC, No.
IPR2013-00016 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 25, 2014) (construing seven means plus function claims in
proposed amendments).
172 See U.S. Bancorp v. Ret. Capital Access Mgmt. Co., No. CBM2013-00014, at 10–12
(P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014). Alice was handed down on June 19, 2014.  Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
173 See SAP, No. CBM2013-00013, at 15–18; U.S. Bancorp, No. CBM2013-00014, at 12–20.
174 See, e.g., LinkedIn Corp. v. AvMarkets Inc., No. CBM2013-00025, at 5 (P.T.A.B Nov.
10, 2014) (discussing a general purpose computer and abstractness).
175 See eBay, Inc. v. Paid, Inc., No. CBM2014-00127 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 30 2014) (institution
decision); U.S. Bancorp., No. CBM2013-00014 at 12, 14–15; Interthinx, Inc. v. Corelogic
Solutions, LLC, No. CBM2012-00007, at 9–10 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 30, 2014), appeal dismissed sub
nom., In re Corelogic Solutions, LLC, 571 F. App’x 950 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see also Ex parte
Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 8, 2006); Kevin Emerson
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pense with that step, which, in some cases, may make patents more
vulnerable in court than in the PTAB.176
In some instances, the PTAB considers interstitial issues of fact or law
that could have arisen in earlier cases, but did not.  Examples include
whether an SEC filing constitutes prior art.177  Some arise out of the new
procedures themselves, such as determining the relationships that give rise to
privity178 or whether challenges based on subject matter limitations can be
heard by the PTAB.179  Others arise from the procedures, but could have
relevance in the courtroom as well.  An example is determining whether a
claim is within the technical solution exception to CBMs, which (as suggested
earlier) may sometimes help to decide certain subject matter cases in the
wake of Alice.180
The PTAB’s preview capacity should also be extremely helpful as exam-
iners apply the new rules on priority, prior art, and the grace period.  For
example, the AIA substantially changed the language of the novelty provision
of the Patent Act, adding a new phrase—“or otherwise available to the pub-
lic”—to describe art that invalidates a patent.181  The addition raises the
question whether prior practice, which made some confidential uses and
secret sales patent-barring, has been legislatively overruled.182  The PTO
Guidelines suggests this is so,183 but the PTO received numerous comments
arguing that Congress did not mean to change the standard.184  The issue is
quite likely to arise first in a PGR, where the grant of a patent despite evi-
dence of a secret sale could be challenged on the basis that the petition raises
a “novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or
Collins, Prometheus Laboratories, Mental Steps, and Printed Matter, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 391 (2012)
(suggesting an approach based on the mental steps doctrine).
176 See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 719 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“No formal
claim construction was required because the asserted claims disclosed no more than ‘an
abstract idea garnished with accessories’ and there was no ‘reasonable construction that
would bring [them] within patentable subject matter.’” (alteration in original) (citing
Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, No. CV 09-06918 RGK (PLAx), 2010 WL 3360098, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010))).
177 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00009, at 18–19
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-
1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
178 Synopsis, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. IPR2012-00042, at 12–14 (P.T.A.B.
Feb. 19, 2014).
179 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1329–30 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(upholding the PTAB’s determination that § 101 challenges could be heard in CBMs).
180 See, e.g., id. at 1326–27 (determining whether a claim falls within the technical solu-
tions exception).
181 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
182 See Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023,
1046 (2012).
183 See Examination Guidelines for Implementing the First Inventor to File Provisions
of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 11059, 11075 (proposed Feb. 14,
2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1).
184 See id. at 11062.
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patent applications.”185  As noted, the PTAB is not bound by examination
guidelines and it would be of considerable value to have its independent
judgment on these issues, even though the Federal Circuit will ultimately
review the work.
Even regarding issues that arise repeatedly, there are many benefits to
be derived from the PTAB’s closer contact with the field of the invention.
Nonobviousness provides an example.  As we saw, KSR stressed the creative
powers of the person of ordinary skill in the art to take what is known and
adapt or extend it to meet other needs.  The issue of what this means in
terms of what the prior art teaches and what the person of ordinary skill can
do with it comes up in the Internet and software context in CBMs and on a
particularly regular basis in IPRs, where nonobviousness is the main basis for
challenge.  Even the earliest cases show how effectively PTAB panels grapple
with questions of nonobviousness law and fact.  For example, in Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,186 which involved
Internet transactions, one question was whether the prior art on which the
challenge relied must be enabling.  Citing one Federal Circuit case saying it
need not be enabling and a second case saying prior art is presumed to be
enabled, the PTAB cut through to the real question: whether the art in fact
taught an artisan how to practice the patented claim.187  In another part of
the opinion, it determined what people could do on the Internet, and what
the design community was already able to accomplish at the time of the
invention.188  In Garmin International, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Technologies LLC,189
a case about GPS devices, the PTAB demonstrated its approach to the ques-
tions of how a person of ordinary skill who was “not an automaton” would
combine references when there is no explicit statement in the prior art sug-
gesting combination and how such a person would deal with disclosures in
patents that did not claim an invention dealing with the same problem facing
the inventor.190  The Board also considered (and rejected) a series of argu-
185 35 U.S.C. § 324(b).
186 No. CBM2012-00010 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
187 Id. at 3, 24–25 (citing In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282, 1292 (Fed. Cir.
2012); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003));
see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00004 (P.T.A.B. Jan.
23, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL
5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015) (stressing that a reference is read for “everything it
teaches” and not simply for the invention it describes).
188 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00010, at 15–23 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 24, 2014).
189 No. IPR2012-00001 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 13, 2013), aff’d sub nom., In re Cuozzo Speed
Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
190 Id. at 5, 32–34, 35–36; see also Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00007 &
IPR2013-00256, at 23 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014), aff’d, Softview LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592 F.
App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (distinguishing between a suggestion to combine
and what PHOSITA could do with another’s proof of concept); Micron Tech., Inc. v. Bd.
of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. IPR2013-00006, at 18–20 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 10, 2014), aff’d, Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ill. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 596 F. App’x 923 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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ments on when an art discourages (“teaches away” from) the claimed inven-
tion, including arguments about the absence of affirmative statements on
feasibility and cost.191  In Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., it discussed what
constitutes “analogous art” to a system for data access in a packet switched
network.192
In addition, the PTAB has had to reconcile the parts of Federal Circuit
law on nonobviousness that the Supreme Court has not directly reversed with
the Court’s current approach to the issue.  Thus, in Kyocera Corp. v. Softview
LLC,193 a case on Internet displays (such as HTML), the question was how to
use the objective criterion of nonobviousness, which the Federal Circuit has
mandated be considered in every nonobviousness case.194  Reliance on these
so-called “secondary considerations” (such as commercial success) to support
a finding of patentability has been highly controversial.195  It is also some-
what difficult to square with KSR’s rejection of rigid rules and its notion that
commercial demand can undermine patentability by providing sufficient moti-
vation to advance the art.  In Kyocera, the PTAB lessened the tension by
assigning to the patent holder a heavy burden of showing a nexus between
commercial success and the patented feature.  Further, it elaborated on what
must be shown: “[P]roof that the sales were a direct result of the unique
characteristics of the claimed invention.”196
In many of these cases, the basic rules derive from Federal Circuit case
law.  However, the contextual use of the case law, the systematic nature of the
inquiry, and the showing required of the party bearing the burden of proof
will provide useful guidance to examiners.197  As Federal Circuit Judge Ray-
mond Chen put it:
191 In re Cuozzo, No. IPR2012-00001 at 36–38; see also Illumina, Inc. v. Trs. of Columbia
Univ., No. IPR2013-00011, at 24–25 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 6, 2014), aff’d, Trs. of Columbia Univ. v.
Illumina, Inc., No. 2014-1547,  2015 WL 4385761 (Fed. Cir. July 17 2015) (taking a hard
line on what constitutes teaching away and taking a very skeptical approach to claims of no
reasonable expectation of success); Nichia Corp. v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, at
27–29 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014), aff’d, Emcore Corp. v. Nichia Corp., 599 F. App’x 959 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (taking a hard line on what constitutes teaching away).
192 Nos. IPR2012-00026 & IPR2013-00109, at 50 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 19, 2014), rev’d on other
grounds, Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
193 Nos. IPR2013-00004, -00257, at 31 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014), aff’d, 592 F. App’x 949
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
194 See, e.g., Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
195 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspec-
tives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803 (1988).
196 Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00007, -00256, at 32 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27,
2014); see also Apple, Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00020, at 43–44
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014) (imposing a heavy burden on the patent holder to show the rele-
vance of success); Illumina, Inc., No. IPR2013-00011, at 40 (insisting that success cannot be
the result of an unclaimed feature, or to a feature in the prior art).
197 See also Tim Bianchi, AIA Post-Grant Practice Rapidly Integrates Federal Circuit and Board
Decisions, REEXAMLINK (June 1, 2013), http://www.reexamlink.com/2013/06/aia-cbm-post-
grant-practice-becomes-a-convergence-of-sap-v-versata-cbm-and-cls-bank-decision/ (sug-
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I foresee an opportunity for these board decisions to assist in a forward-look-
ing way to improve patent quality.  The patent board will be developing a
large body of data that can perhaps yield patterns or insights for what went
right, or what went wrong during the initial examination process.  And the
agency can use those lessons learned to improve patent examination.  In the
next few years, the patent board will have created a rich source of in-house
generated material the agency can potentially use to further improve the
quality of patent examination.198
PTAB decisions could be similarly helpful to district court judges.
Indeed, the availability of detailed instruction from the PTAB could change
the nature of Federal Circuit jurisprudence.  Thus, one reason why the Fed-
eral Circuit tends to create rules that the Supreme Court regards as overly
“rigid” may be that it is drawing bright lines that nontechnical trial judges
can apply with ease, thereby effectuating its perceived mandate to ensure the
uniform application of patent law.199  The Supreme Court dislikes this
approach because—like all rules—it will not lead to the right result in every
case and perhaps also because, as in KSR and Mayo, errors tend to favor the
patent holder.  Furthermore, although the Supreme Court has never done so
directly, one can question the Federal Circuit’s categorization of what consti-
tutes a question of law and what constitutes a question of fact: Why, for exam-
ple, is enablement a question of law and written description a question of fact
when both are meant to guarantee the adequacy of disclosure?200  The
answer may again be uniformity: by classifying heavily technical issues as legal
questions, the court can review the district court’s resolution de novo.
Now that the PTAB is in the picture, the rigid rules and distorted classifi-
cations of questions as law or fact may not be needed, for the PTAB’s deci-
sions spell out more clearly how factual issues should be determined and lay
out detailed analyses for particularly difficult technologies.  If parties begin
to cite what Judge Chen calls the PTAB’s “patterns or insights,”201 bright line
rules and de novo review may become less necessary.  As a result, the number
gesting that the PTAB will provide guidance on implementing Federal Circuit cases and
giving the example of PTAB decisions applying the then-recent Federal Circuit opinion in
Alice).
198 Tamlin Bason, Judge Chen: Board Could Develop Rich Data Source that Will Help Improve
Patent Quality, 88 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1676, 1676 (2014) (quoting Fed-
eral Circuit Judge Raymond T. Chen).  Given these views, it is perhaps not surprising that
the approach that Judge Chen has taken to abstractness is very close to that of the one the
PTAB uses in its institution decisions. See DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773
F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Apple Inc. v. SightSound Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00021
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2013) (institution decision) (articulating in detail how the claims are
drawn to a specific implementation of an abstract idea).
199 See Dreyfuss, Learning, supra note 22, at 798.
200 Compare Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA,
Inc., 617 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Whether a claim satisfies the enablement
requirement is a question of law that we review de novo.”), with In re Bimeda Research &
Dev. Ltd., 724 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Written description . . . is a question of
fact.”).
201 Bason, supra note 198, at 1676 (quoting Federal Circuit Judge Raymond T. Chen).
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of reversals could be reduced.  And now that the Supreme Court has insisted
that the Federal Circuit carefully distinguish between ultimate questions of
law and subsidiary questions of fact, such reclassifications would also simplify
trials and appeals.202
The cases suggest that the PTAB can also be helpful in reducing the
effects of isolation.  As many observers have noted, the Federal Circuit some-
times backslides into old practices.203  The PTAB could play a role in moder-
ating that tendency.  Once again, nonobviousness furnishes an example.  As
we saw, the Supreme Court has emphasized that people of ordinary skill are
creative and not automatons.  But in K/S HIMPP v. Hear-Wear Technologies
LLC,204 the Federal Circuit limited the reach of the decision to the specific
context of KSR, where the question was whether a person with ordinary skill
could combine references without a specific suggestion to do so.  Thus, it
refused to consider an ordinary artisan creative enough to make use of an
element not mentioned in the cited prior art (a plurality of prongs that pro-
vide a detachable mechanical and electrical connection), but which was pub-
licly available at the time of the invention.  The court held that ordinary
knowledge in the field can be used only on “peripheral issues.”205  In his
dissent, Judge Dyk argued that the inability of examiners to rely “on their
expert knowledge and common sense about what is well known in the art” is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s concern about rigid rules.206  Had the
majority considered what is happening in the PTAB, it might have found the
dissent more persuasive.  The cases there show that the use of background
knowledge can come up in many contexts, making it rather unlikely that the
KSR Court intended to spawn satellite litigation on whether a particular cir-
cumstance was peripheral or central, or to limit consideration of an artisan’s
creativity and other motivations to only certain issues.207
202 See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
203 See, e.g., Benjamin & Rai, supra note 19, at 289–90 (noting backsliding with regard
to the standard of review); Burstein, supra note 16, at 507 (discussing backsliding regard-
ing standing); Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness Test for New Pharmaceutical
Compounds: Gobbledygook? 20–21 (Ohio St. U. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper
Series, No. 271, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2486559 (noting backsliding on
obviousness).
204 751 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
205 Id. at 1365–66.
206 Id. at 1367 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  As Benjamin & Rai observe, arguments about spe-
cialized knowledge (and dissents by Judge Dyk) have a history in the Circuit.  Benjamin &
Rai, supra note 19, at 291–92.
207 See, e.g., Corning Optical Commc’ns RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband, Inc., No. IPR2013-
00347, at 22 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2014) (considering various techniques known by persons of
ordinary creativity); Intelligent Bio-Sys., Inc. v. Illumina Cambridge Ltd., No. IPR2013-
00266, at 28 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 28, 2014) (finding improvement would have been predictable
to one with ordinary skill in the art, as determined by KSR); Ariosa Diagnostics v. ISIS
Innovation Ltd., No. IPR2012-00022, at 36 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 2, 2014) (finding the ability of
an ordinary artisan to perform operation in a manner that always produces a given result);
Intellectual Ventures Mgmt., LLC. v. Xilinx, Inc., No. IPR2012-00020, at 9 (P.T.A.B. Feb.
11, 2014) (deciding tacit knowledge can be used in IPRs, even though they are statutorily
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A less intuitive example is claim construction, where a strong argument
can be made that the Federal Circuit should allow itself to be influenced by
the PTAB.  That is, it should abandon its reliance on the meaning the claim
“would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of
the invention”208 and instead adopt the practice of giving unexpired claims
their broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI).  To be sure, this use of the
BRI is a PTO innovation.  Unlike the standard for proving unpatentability, it
is not statutorily imposed.  It is by far the most controversial aspect of the
administration of the three new procedures;209 indeed, bills pending before
Congress would reject its use.210  As we saw, using a broad interpretation
leads to the invalidation of claims that would have been upheld in court
(even on a preponderance of the evidence standard).211  This comes across
as extremely unfair.  Of course, if it were as easy to amend claims in CBMs,
IPRs, and PGRs as it is to amend them during examination, the system would
make some sense: the patent holder would retain exclusivity over advances
that it had the right to protect.  However in Idle Free Systems, Inc. v. Bergstrom,
Inc., the PTAB took a stringent approach to motions to amend: it put the
burden of establishing patentability on the patent holder (in examination,
the PTO would bear the burden of showing unpatentability).212  The patent
holder must also set forth the knowledge of one skilled in the art and the
closest prior art.  Further, the amendment must respond directly to the rea-
son the Board invalidated the original claim, and it must be narrower than
the claim it replaces.213  The Idle Free approach has led to very few successful
amendments: as of the date of the Love and Ambwani study, the only amend-
ment the PTAB granted in an IPR was one that was unopposed and filed by
the United States.214
limited to the consideration of patents and publications). But see Progressive Cas. Ins. Co.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949, *3 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015)
(suggesting the PTAB’s opinion would have benefited from more discussion on motivation
to combine—one of the issues on which the KSR Court thought the Federal Circuit was
too rigid).
208 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
209 See, e.g., John R. Kenny & Scott I. Forman, The Broadest Reasonable Construction Stan-
dard and the Consideration of Claim Construction by a District Court at the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 88 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1084 (2014); COAL. FOR 21ST CENTURY
PATENT REFORM, WHY THE PTO’S USE OF THE BROADEST REASONABLE INTERPRETATION OF
PATENT CLAIMS IN POST-GRANT AND INTER PARTES REVIEWS IS INAPPROPRIATE UNDER THE
AMERICA INVENTS ACT (2013), http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/pdfs/ThePTOsUseOf
BRIIsInappropriate6-19-2013.pdf.
210 See The STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015) (mandating use of
the “ordinary and customary meaning of the claim as understood by a person having ordi-
nary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains”).
211 See supra note 124. R
212 No. IPR2012-00027, at 26 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 7, 2014).
213 Id. at 26–36.
214 Love and Ambwani, supra note 2, at 101–02.  Since then, at least two other petitions
have been granted. See Reg Synthetic Fuels, LLC v. Neste Oil OYJ, No. IPR2014-00192
(P.T.A.B. June 5, 2015); Chi. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. 5th Mkt., Inc., No. CBM2013-00027
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Surprisingly however, in In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, the Federal
Circuit’s first encounter with these procedures, it approved use of the BRI.215
However, the use of two standards, one for court and one for the PTAB,
creates considerable inefficiency.  If both tribunals used the same rule, the
PTAB could dispense with claim construction in any case in which the district
court had already interpreted the claims.  Conversely, construction by the
technologically sophisticated experts at the PTAB would provide a wealth of
information to district courts later considering the same or related claims.
Beyond efficiencies, adopting the BRI for judicial proceedings would have an
even more important benefit, for the Federal Circuit’s own “ordinary mean-
ing” rule has presented many difficulties, including notoriously high reversal
rates, contradictory interpretations, and demoralized trial court judges.216
In Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., the Supreme Court tried to
ameliorate the problem by distinguishing between underlying issues of fact,
which are resolved by extrinsic evidence and are reviewable only for clear
error, and legal issues, which rely on intrinsic evidence (the patent and its
prosecution history) and receive de novo review.217  However, that decision is
likely to produce collateral litigation on whether a construction requires a
factual inquiry and lead attorneys to shield district court wins by relying more
on experts.218
Although proposals before Congress would converge on the claim con-
struction standard used in court,219 serious consideration should be given to
instead adopting the PTO’s standard in litigation.  In most cases, the
approaches yield similar results in any event,220 but the PTO uses the BRI for
unexpired patents in all office proceedings for good reason: it believes the
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 23, 2015) (granting motion for rehearing). Chicago Mercantile was, however,
somewhat unique in that the claim was invalidated for indefiniteness, not obviousness.
Accordingly, the PTAB did not require a showing that it was patentably distinct from the
prior art.
215 793 F.3d 1268, 1275–79 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc.,
789 F.3d 1292, 1297 (Fed. Cir.  2015).  For a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s reasoning
in these cases and the dissents regarding Cuozzo, see supra note 159 and infra text accompa- R
nying notes 236–46. R
216 See O’Malley et al., supra note 26, at 682 (statement of Judge Patti Saris); David L.
Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 230, 229 n.20 (2008); Bryan Hall, Note, A Flawed Patent
System: How to Address the Claim Construction Problem in Litigation, 11 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 411, 411 (2013) (noting “the egregious claim construction reversal rate of 32.5%”
at the Federal Circuit).
217 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
218 See id. at 852 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Significantly, the majority thought “subsidi-
ary factfinding is unlikely to loom large in the universe of litigated claim construction.” Id.
at 840.  Had the Court considered practice before the PTAB, it might have been less san-
guine, as use of experts on claim construction is common in these proceedings.
219 See The STRONG Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102 (2015).
220 See Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00020, at 8 (P.T.A.B. Oct.
7, 2014) (PTAB adopted the district court’s claim interpretation and used it in the final
written decision); Thomas King & Jeffrey A. Wolfson, PTAB Rearranging the Face of Patent
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BRI to yield “more uniform and satisfactory results.”221  It is not surprising
that this is so.  The BRI provides a benchmark that the Federal Circuit’s cur-
rent standard lacks.  In an earlier era, claims were construed to preserve their
validity (and in light of the claimed infringement); once the Supreme
Court’s decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.222 made claim con-
struction an issue of law and courts began to interpret claims in separate
hearings held before evidence on invalidity (or infringement) was adduced,
that canon became “a last resort, not a first principle.”223  Courts were then
forced to make unguided determinations on what an ordinary artisan would
understand, using a variety of tools that have changed throughout the course
of the Federal Circuit’s history.224  In contrast, although the BRI has some
wiggle room (“reasonable”), it includes an objective standard (“broadest”)
while still incorporating ordinary meanings and the traditional approach of
allowing the patent holder to be its own lexicographer.  As the PTAB articu-
lates it, “[u]nder the broadest reasonable construction standard, claims
terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as would be under-
stood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the entire
disclosure.”225
Of course, if valid claims are construed more broadly, the scope for
infringement liability will increase.  However, the BRI standard closely
matches the construction that risk-averse potential users of the invention
likely employ in deciding their freedom to operate.  Accordingly, it may not
have a significant impact on public access.  Furthermore, using this standard
would have a disciplining effect.  If the BRI is more likely to lead to cancella-
tion and invalidation, then drafters may begin to claim more narrowly; if it is
used in enforcement actions, it may deter some infringement.  Given that
damages awards have been reduced and injunctive relief has become less
certain, this approach could restore balance to the system.226
As this Section demonstrates, there is much in the PTAB’s decisions that
could be of considerable value to the examining corps and to the courts.
Litigation, 6 LANDSLIDE 18, 21 (2013) (“[I]t is more likely that the Federal Circuit will sim-
ply keep the two claim construction standards as close as possible.”).
221 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, at 7–8, 11–12
(June 11, 2013), aff’d, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir.
2015); see also In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (2015) (noting that the BRI permits the
PTAB to adopt a single construction for use across multiple proceedings—in other words,
it creates uniformity).
222 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
223 MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
224 See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing the
history); see also ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 771–79 (6th ed. 2013).
225 Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-00003, at 10 (Feb.
11, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL
5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
226 See Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009); eBay, Inc. v.
MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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The Board could, however, do better.  Like the Federal Circuit, the PTAB
tends to suppress almost all reference to underlying policy.  Its contribution
would be considerably greater if its reasoning were transparent.  A dialogue
between the tribunals that included candid analyses of policy options would
be more fruitful, and joint consideration of these issues by the PTAB and the
Federal Circuit would also enrich ultimate consideration by the Supreme
Court.
B. Federal Circuit Review of PTAB Decisions
While the procedures instituted by the AIA could contribute signifi-
cantly to the sound administration of patent law, enjoying the benefits will
depend heavily on whether the Federal Circuit is willing to grant a healthy
degree of deference to PTAB decisions (that is, share its authority over pat-
ent jurisprudence) and on what it makes of the PTO’s rules regulating the
proceedings in which these decisions are issued.  These are not easy ques-
tions.  Congress interposed dispute resolution in a specialized agency under
review in a specialized court.  However, it failed to make clear how the two
tribunals ought to relate to one another.  The statute gave the PTO authority
to “prescribe regulations . . . establishing and governing . . . [the three new
methods of] review,”227 but it did not mandate notice and comment,228 thus
arguably withholding formal rulemaking authority.  Similarly, Congress
directed the PTO to entertain inter partes PGR, IPR, and CBM review and
specifically mentioned discovery, responsive filings, oral hearings, and final
written determinations; the AIA also renamed the BPAI the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board.229  However the statute nowhere incorporates the phrase “on
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,”230 which is the best evi-
dence that Congress intended the procedures to constitute formal adjudica-
227 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a), 326(a) (2012).  For CBMs, “the Director shall issue regulations
establishing and implementing a transitional post-grant review proceeding for review of
the validity of covered business method patents.”  AIA § 18(a)(1), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011).
228 The PTO did, however, provide notice and opportunities to comment on the regu-
lations. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7041
(proposed Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42); Changes to Implement Post-
Grant Review Proceedings, 77 Fed. Reg. 7060 (proposed Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 42); Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents—Definition
of Technological Invention, 77 Fed. Reg. 7095 (proposed Feb. 10, 2012) (to be codified at
37 C.F.R. pt. 42).  See also Federal Register Notices – 2012, U.S PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/news/fedreg/fr_2012.jsp (last modified Jan. 27, 2015), for other
notices of proposed rulemakings under the AIA.
229 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556(b), (d), 557 (2012) (laying out the requirements for adjudica-
tion); 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316(a) (charging the PTO with creating procedures for inter partes
review); Benjamin and Rai, supra note 19, at 327–28.
230 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
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tions and thus intended to delegate to the agency interpretive authority
entitled to judicial deference.231
Not only is the statute unclear about how much authority Congress
meant to vest in the PTO, the Federal Circuit’s past approach to agency
review has been decidedly mixed.  As Arti Rai and Stuart Benjamin docu-
mented in 2007, despite Dickinson v. Zurko,232 which admonished the Federal
Circuit to apply mainstream administrative law to its review of agency action,
the Federal Circuit has not consistently done so. Tafas v. Doll,233 the Federal
Circuit’s previous foray into PTO rulemaking, produced a split decision.  The
court rejected a PTO rule on continuations because, in one judge’s view, no
deference was owed the PTO, and in the other two judges’ view, because the
rule had a substantive effect inconsistent with the Patent Act.234  Substan-
tively, while the Federal Circuit has reviewed factual findings on a substantial
evidence standard (or for clear error), it has reviewed PTO legal determina-
tions de novo.235
The AIA’s delineation of the PTO’s new authorities and obligations
ought to have prompted the Federal Circuit to reconsider its approach to
administrative deference.  But the early cases reviewing the PTO’s authority
and PTAB decisions, In re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, Microsoft Corp. v. Prox-
yconn, Inc., and Versata Development Grp., Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., suggest that
the court is not ready to take systematic heed of congressional willingness to
rely on the PTO.236  Quite the reverse.
To be sure, in Cuozzo, the court referenced the Chevron framework in
reaching the decision to approve the PTAB’s use of the BRI.  It assumed—
arguendo—that since Congress was silent on claim construction, the PTO
could adopt a reasonable interpretation.  It found the BRI to be reasonable
because it was supported by the policy rationales applicable to other forms of
examination.237  The Chevron analysis was, however, extremely short (two
paragraphs) and mechanical.  Indeed, the court withdrew its initial opinion
in the case238 in order to add a paragraph emphasizing that it did not, in
fact, agree to the use of the BRI on Chevron grounds.  In the revised opinion,
231 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001); Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
232 527 U.S. 150 (1999).
233 559 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  Further complicating the matter, the rule was with-
drawn, mooting the Federal Circuit’s decision to rehear the case en banc.  Tafas v. Kappos,
586 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (refusing to vacate the trial court decision invalidating a
whole series of PTO regulations).
234 37 C.F.R. § 1.78(d)(1)(i) (since withdrawn); see also Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Rader, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 1360
(majority opinion); id. at 1366 (Bryson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235 Benjamin and Rai, supra note 19, at 288–89, 300; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706.
236 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); In re
Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn,
Inc. 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
237 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279.
238 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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it denied that “Congress has newly granted the PTO power to interpret sub-
stantive statutory ‘patentability’ standards.”239  According to the court,
“[s]uch a power would represent a radical change in the authority historically
conferred on the PTO by Congress, and we could not find such a transforma-
tion effected by the regulation-authorizing language of § 316.”240
Instead, the court devoted most of its discussion of the BRI (eight
paragraphs) to its own interpretation of the AIA.  Noting that the BRI has
been applied “for more than 100 years in various types of PTO proceed-
ings,”241 it reasoned that Congress must have been aware of it and thus can
be said to have implicitly approved its use.242  As to PTO-imposed limitations
on amendment (which, as we saw, is a major reason for the BRI controversy),
the court did not apply Chevron at all.  Rather, it found the availability of
amendment sufficient,243 once again reasoning that congressional awareness
can be taken as adoption.
Despite the court’s careful clarification that its approval of the BRI was
not because of deference to the PTO, the decision to deny a rehearing en
banc still drew two strong dissents.244  The dissenters mainly claimed that
since post-grant opposition was meant to be a cheap substitute for litigation,
it was more appropriate to use what they termed the “actual” construction of
challenged claims.245  But echoing her position in Tafas, Chief Judge Prost
also questioned whether the standard of construction fell within the PTO’s
procedural authority.  Because in her view it did not, the choice of the BRI
merited no Chevron deference at all.246
Given the Cuozzo court’s heavy reliance on past practice regarding claim
construction, it is not surprising the court has been even more skeptical of
PTO authority on issues unique to post-grant practices.  In Proxyconn, the
question was whether the Board’s Idle Free decision appropriately required
the patent holder to prove an amendment was patentably distinct over all the
prior art in the record (and not merely the art the petitioner raised).
Although this time the court expressly referenced the standard articulated in
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),247 it mainly provided its own assess-
ment of the rule and the procedure used to create it.248
Versata, a CBM, was much the same.  The Federal Circuit acknowledged
that Congress had left it to the PTO to define the term “covered business
method” and carefully noted that the PTO had considered both the legisla-
tive history and public responses to the notice it published in the Federal
239 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279.
240 Compare In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279, with In re Cuozzo, 778 F.3d at 1282.
241 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1276.
242 Id. at 1278.
243 Id. at 1277–78.
244 In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (denying rehearing
en banc).
245 See id. at 1301.
246 See id. at 1302.
247 Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc. 789 F.3d 1292, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
248 See id. at 1306–08.
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Register.  Nonetheless, the court conducted its own assessment.249  In the
end, it decided that it agreed with the PTO that covered business methods
are not limited to products and services of the financial sector, noting only at
the very end of that section of the opinion that the PTO’s expertise entitles it
to “substantial deference in how it defines its mission.”250  It handled
another issue that arose in the case similarly, deciding for itself that in CBMs,
the PTAB has authority to decide whether the claims are drawn to patentable
subject matter.251
The fate of matters like the narrow constraints the PTO placed on how
the parties present their cases (the time and page limits; the minimal discov-
ery), which have no history and are not tied to the PTAB’s mission, are even
more difficult to determine.  It is, however, worth nothing that although
page, time, discovery, and argument limitations have an impact on the par-
ties’ ability to present their cases (especially in light of the broad view of the
grounds that can be asserted, at least in CBMs), these limits do not appear to
significantly impair argumentation, and they are well tailored to Congress’s
goal of creating a quick and less expensive way to weed out invalid claims.252
Furthermore, PTAB panels enjoy the discretion to alter many of these limits
in the interest of justice or for good cause.253  Thus, if a Chevron standard
were applied, these regulations appear to lie squarely within the regulatory
authority Congress accorded to the PTO and to be consistent with the Patent
Act and permissible interpretations of the AIA.254
249 See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1323–26 (2015).  For the
legislative history considered, see supra text accompanying notes 94–95.
250 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1325.  The court also considered the PTO’s regulation defining
“technological invention” but apparently found it so devoid in meaning that it did not
bother to state a standard for reviewing it. See id. at 1326.
251 Id. at 1329–30.
252 Cf. Zetec, Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., LLC, No. IPR2014-00384, at 16 (P.T.A.B.
July 23, 2014) (institution decision) (exercising discretion to refuse to institute IPR on the
grounds that the Office must promulgate procedures that “tak[e] into consideration . . .
‘the efficient administration of the Office[ ] and the ability of the Office to timely com-
plete proceedings instituted,’ among other factors” (alteration in original) (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 316(b) (2012))).
253 See, e.g., Kyocera Corp. v. Softview LLC, Nos. IPR2013-00007 & IPR2013-00256, at 8
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014) (noting the previous permitting of extra briefing), aff’d, Softview
LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592 F. App’x 947 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
254 The PTAB procedures have also been challenged for depriving the parties of a trial
by jury and for violating separation of power principles.  In Cooper v. Lee, the issues were
raised in a declaratory judgment action but dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
procedures.  No. 1:14-cv-00672-GBL-JFA, 2015 WL 686041, at *9 (E.D. Va. Feb. 18, 2015).
The district court did, however, note that the Federal Circuit had upheld the constitution-
ality of ex parte reexamination in a decision the Supreme Court declined to review. Id. at
*2 (citing Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). B&B Hardware, Inc.
v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015), which held that an issue decided by the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) is preclusive of later litigation in an Art. III
court, suggests that the Supreme Court is unlikely to find that the PTAB deprives the pat-
ent holder of a right to a jury trial.
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Whereas procedurally, Cuozzo, Proxyconn, and Versata send a somewhat
mixed message, substantively, they do no such thing: nothing in these deci-
sions even gestures at the notion that the Federal Circuit is prepared to defer
to PTAB decisions.255  In reviewing the merits, Cuozzo and Proxyconn cited
Teva.256  In other words, the court adopted the standard the Supreme Court
imposed on review of district court claim constructions to consider the PTAB’s
claim construction.  Indeed, in Proxyconn, the court reversed the PTAB’s con-
struction of the claim,257 even though the court is less versed in the applica-
tion of the BRI than is the PTAB.  In Versata, it went much further.  First,
despite having decided in Cuozzo that it had no jurisdiction to review PTAB
decisions on whether to institute IPRs,258 the Versata court redefined the
issue: it decided it could review whether the PTAB had exceeded its CBM
authority by hearing challenges to patents that it misidentified as drawn to
“covered business methods.”259  And even though the court accepted the
Board’s definition of what constituted a “covered business method,” and
despite its own complete lack of case law on the meaning of a “covered busi-
ness method” or a “technological invention,” it nevertheless reviewed the
PTAB decision de novo.260  Similarly, it reviewed the question whether the
invention at issue was patentable subject matter in the same way as it would
have reviewed a decision of a trial court.261
This approach may be a function of the court’s skepticism as to whether
the APA applies with full force to the PTO (which was created a century
before the rise of the administrative state and is mentioned only marginally
in the legislative history of the APA).262  Or it may stem from a fear that the
PTAB is, indeed, acting like a “death squad.”  Alternatively, it may derive
from what Judge Hughes, in dissenting from Versata’s holding that institution
decisions are reviewable, claims is an “appetite for arrogating to the court the
255 It is, however, worth noting that Garmin, the party that brought the challenge in
Cuozzo, withdrew from the appeal as part of a settlement. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC,
793 F.3d 1268, 1272 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2015).  Thus, no one had an incentive to argue for
deference to the PTO’s determination on the merits of the case.  Yet the precedential
value of the decision stands. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1297
(Fed. Cir. 2015).  It should also be noted that Proxyconn is the first reversal: many PTAB
cases are affirmed without opinion. See Tony Dutra, Federal Circuit Affirms Three Cases With-
out Opinion Two Days After Oral Arguments, 89 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 1607
(2015) (citing former chief judge of the Federal Circuit Paul Michel as saying that the
court may be deferring to the PTAB’s expertise in law and technology—or it may simply
have too many cases coming from the PTAB to review them more carefully).
256 Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1297; In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1279–80.
257 Proxyconn, 789 F.3d at 1299.
258 In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273.
259 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1321–23 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
260 See id. at 1323–27.
261 Id. at 1330–36.
262 See Mark D. Torche´, Note, Rubber Stamp or Court of Last Resort: The Proper Standard of
Review in Patent and Trademark Cases, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 211, 227 (1999) (noting an argu-
ment by Professor Janice Mueller that the legislative history of the APA made it clear that
the PTO was exempt from its standards of review).
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Board’s statutory authority.”263  But to the extent that the court’s attitude
derives from the perception that the PTO lacks formal adjudicatory author-
ity, it should be reconsidered.  Plenary review is not, as Judge Hughes put it,
“how Congress designed the AIA to work.”264  As Melissa Wasserman has
cogently argued, the imposition of procedural safeguards, as well as the men-
tion of “court-like proceeding[s]” in the House Report on the AIA, suggest
that these procedures were to “be accompanied with a policy-making or law-
making ability.”265  She also notes that it is hard to understand why Congress
would have provided for post-grant review of “novel or unsettled legal ques-
tion[s] that [are] important to other patents or patent applications” if it had
not intended the PTAB to speak with the force of law and for its decisions to
be entitled to deference.266
As the system has gone into operation, other reasons to believe that Con-
gress expected the court to give substantial deference to the PTAB have
emerged.  First, as the next Section describes in more detail, the same claims,
patents, and families of patents, all using similar terms and concepts, can be
the target of multiple proceedings; often, the challenges are brought by the
same petitioners.  Occasionally, what are essentially protective petitions are
filed—that is, petitions challenging claims the PTAB has already cancelled,
apparently filed out of concern that the cancellation decision will be
reversed.267  Unless the patent holder can rely on the near-binding effect of
PTAB determinations on the parties (and a stare decisis effect on nonpar-
ties), the tax that these multiple procedures impose will be formidable.
Since, presumably, Congress did not (in Judge Hughes’s words) adopt these
procedures to create “unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs” or
to chill innovation, it can be inferred that it intended the PTAB’s decisions to
be entitled to deference.268
Notably, Congress made the estoppel effect of PTAB decisions depen-
dent on the issuance of a final written decision of the Board.269  In contrast,
the Federal Circuit has suggested that the estoppel effect of other PTO deter-
minations—to which deference is not accorded—is triggered only after all
263 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1337 (Hughes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
264 Id. at 1343.
265 Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the
PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1983–84, 1993 (2013) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98,
pt. 1, at 68 (2011)); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 19, at 327–28.
266 Wasserman, supra note 265, at 1993 (quoting AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(d), 125
Stat. 284, 307 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 324(b) (2012))). But see Matal, supra note 7,
at 609 (suggesting that the provision was added to “create[ ] an avenue by which the ques-
tion can be conclusively resolved by the Federal [C]ircuit  before a large number of
improper patents” are issued (alteration in original) (quoting 154 CONG. REC. S9988 (daily
ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl))).
267 See supra notes 119–22.
268 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1339 (Hughes, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 40 (2011)).
269 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012); id. § 325(e).
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appeals are exhausted.270  Although the estoppel provision is tempered by
the timing of the issuance of the certificate of cancellation and amendment
(which is after appeal),271 the difference in the trigger for estoppel suggests
an intent that PTAB determinations bind not only the patent holder and the
challenger, but also allow the public free use of the claimed invention as
soon as the PTAB determines the claim should be cancelled.  It is difficult to
square that intent with de novo review of institution decisions or legal deter-
minations.  While review has been sought on almost every final written deci-
sion,272 Congress did not provide for expedited appeals.  Given the time it
takes to hear appeals, and especially the historical frequency with which the
Federal Circuit has reversed trial courts on the issue of claim construction,
which is of central importance in these procedures,273 it would be impossible
to bring about finality in the rapid time frame Congress had in mind if such a
high level of scrutiny were applied.274
I leave the question of the precise effect of the AIA on the standard of
review to the administrative law experts.  For these purposes, it is enough to
say that it behooves the Federal Circuit to do more than reflexively reverse
everything that does not accord with its own initial assessment.  Not only
must it consider the more robust safeguards mandated for these procedures,
it should also take the relative capacities of the two institutions into account.
After all, members of the Federal Circuit have often expressed frustration
with the Supreme Court’s lack of expertise and intermittent exposure to pat-
ent cases.275  But as between the Federal Circuit and the PTAB, it is the latter
270 See Abbvie Deutschland GMBH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1296
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding an interference decision non-final under the preclusion law of
the First Circuit because it was subject to court review); Tamimi, supra note 38, at 633–34.
271 35 U.S.C. § 318(b) (“If . . . the time for appeal has expired or any appeal has termi-
nated, the Director shall issue and publish a certificate canceling any claim of the patent
finally determined to be unpatentable . . . .”); id. § 328(b) (“If . . . the time for appeal has
expired or any appeal has terminated, the Director shall issue and publish a certificate
canceling any claim of the patent finally determined to be unpatentable . . . .”).
272 As of Sept. 11, 2014, 62 of the 114 written decisions rendered in IPRs had been
appealed, and the time to appeal had not run out on most of the others. See Casino &
Kasdan, supra note 145.  Similar figures apply to CBMs.
273 See, e.g., Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1075 (2001) (analyzing the increased trend in claim
interpretation-based reversals); David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 1073, 1107 (2010) (“[T]he claim construction reversal rate is unduly high and has
generally been increasing in the last fifteen years.”).
274 Frequent reversals should change under Teva. But see supra note 218 and accompa- R
nying text.
275 As former Chief Judge Michel once said, “There’s . . . a certain amount of suspicion
that there might be some deeper immersion, deeper familiarity, harder thinking and
greater exposure [to patent law] at the Federal Circuit than the Supreme Court itself can
offer.”  Roy Zwhalen, Mayo v. Prometheus: Thought Leaders Express Concern and Evaluate the
Impact, BIOTECH-NOW (May 21, 2012) (alteration in original), http://www.biotech-
now.org/public-policy/patently-biotech/2012/05/mayo-v-prometheus-thought-leaders-
express-concern-evaluate-business-impact-and-discuss-the-future.
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that is closer to the technology and sees the issues more regularly.276  This is
not to say that no review should be accorded (particularly on new issues), but
given the many differences between these procedures and examination,
review of facts on the “substantial evidence” standard the APA mandates for
formal proceedings,277 and review of law on the deferential end of the Skid-
more-Chevron spectrum required for substantive legal and policy decisions, is
not inappropriate from both a normative and an institutional perspective.278
While the AIA can be understood as requiring deference to the PTO on
both rulemaking and adjudication, experience nonetheless demonstrates the
need for the PTO (or Congress) to make some changes.  If the Federal Cir-
cuit does not adopt the BRI for litigation, then the dual approach will be very
difficult to maintain.279  Thus, even though the Federal Circuit approved use
of the BRI, the PTO may wish to rethink it.  If the PTO retains use of the BRI,
then it ought, at least, to reconsider the availability of amendments.  It could,
for example, alter the regulations and Idle Free.  For example, one reason the
PTAB may be reluctant to allow amendments is that the amended claims go
into force without further examination.280  A better approach might be to
have the patent holder announce proposed amendments early in the process
and put the burden on the petitioner to prove these amendments are inva-
lid.281  It would not be a complete solution to the absence of examination—
after all, some amendments may not be of enough interest to a petitioner to
trigger opposition.  But if it were clear to potential petitioners that there is a
viable amendment procedure and that they will be required to protect their
own interests in it, perhaps fewer petitions for review would be filed.  Alterna-
tively, the PTO could clarify when a patent holder whose claims were can-
celled can use ex parte reexamination or, in the case where error can validly
be claimed, reissue, in order to obtain further (albeit narrower)
protection.282
276 See Wasserman, supra note 265, at 2007–17 (comparing the institutional features of
the PTAB with the Federal Circuit); see also Benjamin & Rai, supra note 19, at 315–16, 334.
277 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).
278 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984);
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533
U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001); cf. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 479
(6th Cir. 2015) (according Skidmore deference to the Copyright Office’s determination that
a design is protectable); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Pre-
sumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 63–65 (2007) (arguing that more adversarial adju-
dications should be entitled to greater deference).
279 For further discussion of the problem with a dual approach, see infra text accompa-
nying note 336.
280 This, indeed, was the Federal Circuit’s reason for thinking Idle Free was correctly
decided. See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
281 See, e.g., S. 632, 114th Cong. § 102(c) (2015); S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 11 (Manager’s
Amendment).
282 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–52 (2012) (concerning reissue); id. §§ 301–07 (concerning ex
parte reexamination).  Arguably, the patent holder is estopped from returning to the pat-
ent office by 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3), but it may be possible to rely on a different written
description. See Scott A. McKeown, Patent Reissue as an Alternative to PTAB Amendment Prac-
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There are other matters also worth revisiting.  For example, the peti-
tioner currently has no right to reply directly to the patent owner’s prelimi-
nary response to a petition to institute.  As a result, the petitioner must
anticipate the arguments the patent owner will make and reply to these con-
jectural arguments in the initial petition itself.  This uses precious pages and
also requires the PTAB to wade through arguments and hypothetical
counterarguments that may never become a part of the merits decisions.
Allowing a reply to the preliminary response may be preferable.  Addition-
ally, the page limits and other rules appear to be leading parties to file more
than one petition challenging claims in the same patent, or similar claims in
a family of patents.283  While the Board can refuse to institute when succes-
sive petitions raise “substantially the same . . . argument[ ],” that practice is
within the PTAB’s discretion;284 the Board may not be willing to exercise that
power if the petitioner did not have the space to fully flesh out its argu-
ments.285  To be sure, the Board can sometimes obtain efficiencies through
formal consolidation or by assigning the same panel to hear all the cases,286
but multiple institution decisions and final written decisions must often be
handed down and the efficiencies the PTAB achieves internally are not nec-
essarily shared with the parties themselves.287  The multiplicity of proceed-
tice, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Apr. 8, 2014), http://www.patentspostgrant.com/patent-reissue-
escape-hatch-opens-for-ptab-amendments.
283 See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. SightSound Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00019 (P.T.A.B. Oct.
8, 2013) (institution decision) (refusing to institute a proceeding to challenge claims 1, 2,
4, and 5 of Patent 5,191,573 for not being subject-matter eligible and for lacking a suffi-
cient written description); Apple Inc. v. SightSound Techs., LLC, CBM2013-00020
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014) (instituting and then cancelling claims 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Patent
5,191,573 on obviousness grounds).  According to Director Lee’s blog, the PTO is cur-
rently considering changes in this area.  Lee, supra note 37.
284 See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. The Proctor & Gamble Co., No. IPR2014-00507, at 5
(P.T.A.B. July 7, 2014) (institution decision).
285 Cf. Dell Inc. v. Elec. & Telecomms. Research Inst., No. IPR2015-00549, (P.T.A.B.
Mar. 26, 2015) (institution decision) (refusing to join two petitions in order to preserve the
timeliness of the second one filed).
286 35 U.S.C. § 315(d); id. § 325(d).
287 See, e.g., Groupon, Inc. v. Blue Calypso, LLC, No. CBM2013-00033, -00034, -00035,
00044, -00046, at *1 n.1 (P.T.A.B. May 7, 2014) (decision on admission pro hac vice) (con-
sidering five petitions together, with the admonition that the parties “are not authorized to
use this style heading in any subsequent papers”).  Another example is furnished by the
cases between Liberty Mutual Insurance Co and Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.,
including CBM2012-00002 (regarding a method for determining an automobile insurance
premium based on data collected from monitored motor vehicle operational characteris-
tics and operator’s driving characteristics); and -00003 (regarding a vehicle monitoring
system); -00010 (regarding a system that allows policyholders to access policy information
on the internet); CBM2013-00002 (accessing policy information on the internet) (oral
argument merged with CBM 2012-00010); -00004 (regarding a system for monitoring the
operation of a motor vehicle); and -00009 (regarding a vehicle monitoring system).  All
these were decided by the same panel of administrative patent judges but (with one excep-
tion) were entertained as separate cases.  The Federal Circuit similarly obtained efficien-
cies by reviewing the cases together, see Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
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ings is also problematic for trial courts, for they can never be certain when
practice before the PTAB is over and any stays they issued can be dissolved.
It may, in the end, be more efficient to liberalize the page and time limits
and give potential challengers a longer period in which to join ongoing pro-
ceedings.  Moreover, because the PTAB reconsiders issues decided at the
time of institution (like claim construction) at the merits stage as well,288 it
might also be useful to give parties more scope for argument earlier in the
proceedings.
The point is not that current practice is perfect.  Rather, it is that if Con-
gress fails to step in, then changes should be within the sound discretion of
the PTO.  Federal Circuit judges, many of whom lack case management expe-
rience, are not institutionally best situated to decide how to balance the con-
gressional goal of efficiency against the needs of the parties to present their
cases effectively.
IV. PROBLEMS: COMPLEXITY, ABUSE, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
With the addition of a procedure permitting third parties to submit
information to the PTO prior to patent issuance,289 the AIA envisioned a
“cradle to grave” opportunity for the public to challenge rights to exclusivity.
Preissuance submission hands off to PGR, and then to IPR, with CBMs (tem-
porarily) hovering over claims that are especially questionable.  Through the
use of separate procedures, Congress attempted to strike a careful balance
between promoting public access to unpatentable advances and recognizing
reliance interests that mature as patent holders and licensees pour resources
into exploiting their inventions.  However, three different review procedures
create a great deal of complexity.  As we have seen, patent families can get
caught in a series of successive challenges.  These give rise to complicated
questions on how the results of one review affect the positions that patent
holders, petitioners, their privies or real parties in interest, and strangers can
take in later actions.
Some of these procedures allow any interested party to challenge claims.
While this, too, is commendable from an access-to-knowledge perspective, it
raises procedural questions and can create opportunities for harassment.
Furthermore, as Part I described, the review procedures permit the parties to
rely on (and challenge) experts, make motions to exclude, amend, file objec-
tions to amendments, and present oral arguments.  In practice, these oppor-
No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug 24, 2015).  Similarly, a combined oral
hearing was held on two cases involving Apple and Sightsound Technologies.  This pro-
duced two separate written opinions, issued on the same day. See Apple, Inc. v. Sightsound
Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00023 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014); Apple, Inc. v. Sightsound
Techs., LLC, No. CBM2013-00020 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014).
288 See, e.g., SAP Am., Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, No. CBM2013-00013, at 11–12
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 18, 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CBM2012-
00003, at 11 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., No. 2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).
289 35 U.S.C. § 122(e); 37 C.F.R. § 1.290 (2014).
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tunities are used in many cases.  The expense raises questions as to whether
public domain interests are as well protected as the proponents of these pro-
cedures hoped.  The answers depend on whether problems raised by com-
plexity can be resolved in a fair and evenhanded manner.  This Part discusses
these issues.
A. Complexity and Abuse
As described earlier, the AIA and PTO introduced rules on estoppel that
are designed to prevent the parties from obtaining several bites at the apple.
Under the regulations, a patent holder is “precluded from taking action
inconsistent with [an] adverse judgment, including obtaining in any patent:
(i) a claim that is not patentably distinct from a . . . canceled claim; or (ii)
[a]n amendment of a specification . . . that was denied during the trial.”290
For IPR and PGR challengers, the statute provides that once a final written
decision is handed down, the petitioner, the real party in interest, and the
petitioner’s privies are precluded from maintaining an action in the PTO
with respect to that claim “on any ground that the petitioner raised or rea-
sonably could have raised” in the proceeding.291  Nor can the petitioner
argue in court or in the ITC that the claim is invalid on any ground the
petitioner “raised or reasonably could have raised.”292  CBMs are somewhat
different: once a final written decision is issued, the petitioners or the real
party in interest cannot assert, in courts or in the ITC, an argument that the
claim is invalid on any ground that the petitioner “raised” during the
CBM.293  But despite the considerable detail written into these provisions, it
is already clear that they fail to cover all the ways in which those involved in
these proceedings can nibble at the apple.  Thus, for example, Colleen
Chien and Christian Helmers observe that 82% of IPRs run parallel to litiga-
tion.294  And yet the rules do not say whether the findings of fact and law
made in the course of these procedures are binding on other tribunals as a
matter of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) or stare decisis.295
The poster child for these omissions is the dispute between Versata and
SAP America, where a party that lost in the trial court on the argument that
certain claims were invalid,296 then brought a CBM petition to challenge the
validity of the same claims.297  Such an action is not barred by the AIA or the
290 37 C.F.R. § 42.73(d)(3).
291 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1); id. § 325(e)(1).
292 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2); id. § 325(e)(2).
293 AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(D), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 321 note).
294 Chien & Helmers, supra note 35, at 9.
295 But see Stoll, supra note 76, at 40 (calling the estoppel provision of § 325(e)(2)
“something of a hybrid of claim preclusion and issue preclusion”).
296 Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-153 CE, 2011 WL 4017944 (E.D.
Tex. Sept. 9, 2011).
297 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001 (P.T.A.B. June 11,
2013) (involving claims 26–29 of Patent No. 6,553,350), aff’d, Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP
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regulations adopted by the PTO.  And because potential infringement is con-
tinuing, there is no question of claim preclusion.  Nor does issue preclusion
apply: since the PTAB uses a lower burden of proof on validity and a differ-
ent rule for claim construction, the issues in the review are not the same as
the issues decided by the court.298  The PTAB instituted an action and can-
celled the claims.299  But by the time the PTAB handed down a final written
decision, much had happened: the Federal Circuit had affirmed the trial
court’s damage award, vacated part of the order for injunctive relief, and
remanded to the district court;300 that court had then awarded damages in
the amount of $391 million (the injunction was abandoned).  Arguably, the
subsequent invalidation of the claims in the PTAB should have provided
grounds for the infringement defendant to petition for relief from the $391
million judgment under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 60.301  However, in
a short per curiam order that offered no explanation, the Federal Circuit
denied a motion to stay or for relief from judgment.302  In a later proceed-
ing, the Federal Circuit essentially gave the patent holder a right to contest
the institution decision as part of its review of the merits of the PTAB’s invali-
dation determination.303  However, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB
on both issues, with the result that a party is now forced to pay a rather large
award on account of a patent that is not valid.304
Troubling as Versata looks, the result can be justified on the ground that
it motivates those who believe a patent is invalid to challenge it quickly and
put the invention it covers into the public domain.  In contrast, the opposite
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp, Inc.,
No. CBM2013-00042 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 16, 2013) (challenging, among others, claims 31, 35,
and 36 of Patent 5,878,400).
298 See, e.g., Interthinx, Inc. v. CoreLogic Sols., LLC, No. CBM2012-00007, at 6 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 30, 2014), appeal dismissed sub nom., In re CoreLogic Sols., LLC, 571 F. App’x 950 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).  In a case involving other patents, Versata unsuccessfully tried to mandamus the
PTAB to halt a CBM review. In re Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., 564 F. App’x 1025 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
299 SAP Am., Inc. v. Versata Dev. Grp., Inc., No. CBM2012-00001, at 34 (P.T.A.B. June
11, 2013).  An attempt by the patent holder to challenge the institution decision through
an action in the district court was rejected.  Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Lee, 793 F.3d 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2015).
300 Versata Software, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 717 F.3d 1255, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
301 See, e.g., Flexiteek Ams, Inc. v. PlasTEAK, Inc., No. 08-60996-CIV, 2012 WL 5364263,
at *9 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (granting relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and (6) and noting that “it
would be inequitable and unjust to let stand, let alone enforce, an injunction and an unex-
ecuted money judgment predicated on a patent claim found to be invalid and cancelled”);
cf. Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1341–45 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (per-
mitting reconsideration of relief before a judgment became final).
302 Versata Comput. Indus. Sols., Inc. v. SAP AG, 564 F. App’x 600 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
303 Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1323–27 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
304 See also Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., No. 13-cv-346-bbc, 2015 WL
2248437 (W.D. Wis. May 13, 2015) (staying proceedings after entry of a $44 million
infringement judgment, pending review of a PTAB decision to invalidate the infringed
patent).
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rule—one that absolves challengers of past liability—encourages sharp prac-
tice.  A party with private information about invalidity could infringe, safe in
the knowledge that if it were sued, it would invalidate the patent and free
itself of the obligation to pay damages, all the while retaining any extra prof-
its it captured as a result of, essentially, sharing exclusivity with the patent
holder.  The Versata outcome is not even entirely unprecedented.  For exam-
ple, a licensee who successfully challenges a patent must pay royalties up to
the point where it took the affirmative step of prompting adjudication of
validity.305  Still, if such cases proliferate, U.S. procedure will take on an
aspect of German practice, where infringement suits and validity determina-
tions are bifurcated and decided at different times by different tribunals.
That practice, which regularly leads to damages based on invalid patents, has
been heavily criticized for imposing unjustified cost on the technology
industry.306
Better, perhaps, would be to require the successful challenger to pay
damages, but only up to the time that the petition for review was filed.  Partic-
ularly for patents subject to PGR review, a rule that dates the termination of
liability this way would encourage very early weeding out of invalid claims.
The incidence of these problems would also be minimized if the courts and
the PTAB used the same approach to claim construction, for they would then
more often reach the same conclusion on validity.  In addition, if the Federal
Circuit holds to the position it announced on stays in VirtualAgility, and if the
PTAB develops efficient procedures for consolidating multiple challenges to
the same patents, it will less often happen that a patent is upheld in court
before it is invalidated by the PTAB.307
But even if the system largely avoids the Versata problem, many more
subtle questions on the relationships among these procedures remain to be
worked out.  Not only does the AIA allow a party who lost in litigation to
petition for review, it also appears to permit a party that lost a CBM to bring
an IPR on any issue not actually raised in the CBM, and for their privies to
maintain any action in the PTO or in court.308  Furthermore, because IPRs
305 See, e.g., Bristol Locknut Co. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982);
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, M.B.H. v. Shell Oil Co., 112 F.3d 1561, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see
also generally Andrew C. Michaels, Tones that Echo from a Past Era of Rigid Jurisprudence: Pre-
Challenge Royalties and the Federal Circuit’s Shell Test, 31 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 543
(2015).
306 See Chien & Helmers, supra note 35, at 20–23 (noting the ambiguous effects of
bifurcation on decisions to challenge patents and settle litigation); see also generally KATRIN
CREMERS ET AL., INVALID BUT INFRINGED? AN ANALYSIS OF GERMANY’S BIFURCATED PATENT
LITIGATION SYSTEM (2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Helmers_Christian_IPSC_
paper_2014.pdf; see also RICHARD VARY, BIFURCATION: BAD FOR BUSINESS (2012), https://
www.unitary-patent.eu/sites/www.unitary-patent.eu/files/nokia_vary_bifufcation.pdf.
307 See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.  The problems will not disappear
entirely, however, because there are few time limits on bringing IPRs.  Accordingly, district
courts can never know for sure when to proceed to trial.
308 The omission of a rule barring unsuccessful CBM petitioners from further action in
the PTO is especially difficult to understand—from a timing perspective, it is unlikely that
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can raise only questions about novelty and nonobviousness, IPR losers who
are then threatened with suit could bring CBMs on other matters.  More gen-
erally, because the estoppel applies only to specific claims, the same parties
can file multiple challenges to other claims, even if they are within the same
patent or family of patents.309  Also, the AIA did not abolish ex parte reexam-
ination—yet it says nothing about its relationship to the new procedures.
Furthermore, both PGRs and IPRs can be brought by anyone who is not the
patent holder: there are no standing requirements, as there are in court.
Many (according to Dolin, nearly one third) of the patents in IPR proceed-
ings are subject to multiple IPR requests;310 the same may eventually happen
for PGRs.
Indeed, the availability of these procedures appear to be creating new
defensive strategies and business models and extending old ones.  Patent risk
management services like RPX Corporation, and public interest groups such
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), have begun to file petitions for
review.311  There are even firms—UnifiedPatents is an example—formed
specifically to use IPRs to clear the technology space of their members.312
Further, generic drug companies are filing IPRs instead of, or in addition to,
engaging in Hatch-Waxman litigation,313 and there are a few cases brought
by well-known patent aggregators.314  Another purported technique, alleged
to be practiced by the principals behind the Coalition for Affordable Drugs,
a PGR (which must be filed within nine months of issuance) could follow a written deci-
sion in a CBM (which requires that the petitioner have been accused of infringement).
However, because standing to bring a CBM requires only that the challenger be “charged”
with—and thus, not necessarily “sued” for—infringement, AIA, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
§ 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011), an IPR, which cannot be brought more than a
year after an enforcement action is filed, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012), could in some cases be
instituted even after a CBM proves to be unsuccessful.
309 See, e.g., Petition for Post-Grant Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,684,420, LaRose Indus.,
LLC v. Choon’s Design, Inc., No. PGR2014-00008 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5., 2015).  This was
brought by the same petitioner who brought LaRose Industries, LLC v. Choon’s Design LLC,
No. IPR2014-00218 (P.T.A.B. June 7, 2014).  The IPR ended in an adverse judgment, but
the patent holder filed for a new patent, raising the question whether the new claims were
patentably distinct from the old ones and if so, whether the patent holder is estopped from
arguing their validity.
310 Dolin, supra note 111, at 928.
311 See, e.g., RPX Corp. v. VirnetX Inc., Nos. IPR2014-00171, -00172, -00173, -00174,
-00175, -00176, and -00177 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2014) (institution decision); Elec. Frontier
Found. v. Personal Audio, LLC, No. IPR2014-00070 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2014) (institution
decision).
312 See UNIFIED PATENTS, http://www.unifiedpatents.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2015).
313 See Cyr et al., supra note 160.
314 See, e.g., Intellectual Ventures Mgmt. v. Xilinx, Inc., Nos. IPR 2012-00018, -00019,
-00020, and -00023 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 24, 2013) (decision addressing Xilinx’s real party in inter-
est); Darlene Ghavimi, NPEs Can Potentially Use Inter Partes Review to Target the Life Sciences
Industry, FDA FLASH! (June 16, 2014), http://aiplafda.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/npes-
can-potentially-use-inter-partes-review-to-target-the-life-sciences-industry/; Scott A. McKe-
own, NPE Attempts to Exact License by Threat of IPR, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Aug. 8, 2013),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/npe-attempts-to-exact-license-by-threat-of-ipr.
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is to simultaneously file a petition and short the patent holder’s stock in the
hope that the PTAB’s actions will depress the stock’s price.315  The proce-
dures may also be encouraging “reverse trolling”: soliciting payments from
patent holders for the favor of not filing petitions for review or for settling
cases that have been filed.316  As Greg Dolin describes it, the result is that
“the Damocles sword of post-issuance review perpetually hang[s] over the
patentee’s head.”317  Furthermore, while the PTO has created procedures
that are swift and efficient, they are far from cheap—what with use of experts
and discovery, projected costs are in the range of $150,000 to $300,000 per
party.318  This may be an order of magnitude less than a full-blown trial, but
if it is multiplied several times, the cost can put a patent holder in a precari-
ous position.  Some of these problems may be solved once the concepts men-
tioned in the estoppel provisions (“reasonably could have raised,” “privy,”
“real party in interest”) are better defined.  But the effect of that effort is
likely to be limited.
As to the first phrase (“reasonably could have raised”), the patent holder
would clearly have been much better protected had Congress prevented par-
ties from asserting grounds they “could have raised”—that is, had the legisla-
315 See Michael Loney, The Fine Line Between Abuse and Fair Use at the PTAB, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 27, 2015) http://www.managingip.com/Article/3456658/
The-fine-line-between-abuse-and-fair-use-at-the-PTAB.html (describing how Bass filed fif-
teen IPR petitions against seven pharmaceutical companies and allegedly shorted the stock
of at least some of these firms); Gene Quinn, Patent Abuse or Genius?  Is Kyle Bass Abusing the
Patent System?, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/08/is-
kyle-bass-abusing-the-patent-system/id=56613/.  So far, the PTAB has declined to institute
these petitions. See, e.g., Coal. for Affordable Drugs v. Acorda Therapeutics, No. IPR2015-
00720 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 24, 2015) (institution decision).  However, the PTAB has not been
willing to sanction Bass. See Kelly Knaub, PTAB Won’t Sanction Bass for AIA Reviews of Drug
Patents, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/707663.
316 An example may be New Bay Capital, LLC, an entity that appears to make nothing
but which filed several IPRs against VirnetX. See New Bay Capital, LLC v. VirnetX Inc.,
Nos. IPR2013-00375, -00376, -00377, and -00378 (P.T.A.B. June 23, 2013).  According to
VirnetX, it then received a request from New Bay for ten percent of a verdict that VirnetX
had won in a patent infringement action it had brought against Apple.  New Bay later filed
motions to terminate the IPRs, possibly in response to threatened subpoenas. See Michelle
Carniaux & Michael E. Sander, The Curious Case of New Bay Capital LLC and VirnetX Inc., IPR
BLOG (Nov. 22, 2013), http://interpartesreviewblog.com/curious-case-new-bay-capital-llc-
virnetx-inc/.  Indeed, NPEs may be using these procedures as well. See, e.g., Intellectual
Ventures Mgmt. v. Xilinx, Inc., Nos. IPR 2012-00018, -00019, -00020, and -00023 (P.T.A.B.
Jan. 24, 2013) (decision addressing Xilinx’s real party in interest); Ghavimi, supra note
314; McKeown, supra note 314.
317 Dolin, supra note 111, at 883; see also Karen A. Lorang, Comment, The Unintended
Consequences of Post-Grant Review of Patents, 17 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1, 19 (2013).
318 See Ken Burchfiel, USPTO Post-Grant Opposition Costs–A Forum Conveniens for Invalidity
Disputes, USPTO PATENT TRIALS (May 20, 2012), http://ptopatenttrials.com/2012/05/20/
uspto-post-grant-opposition-costs-a-forum-conveniens-for-invalidity-disputes/; Matthew Cut-
ler, Why Inter Partes and Post-Grant Review Are Game Changers, LAW360 (Jan. 8, 2013), http://
www.law360.com/articles/402322/why-inter-partes-and-post-grant-review-are-game-
changers.
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ture adopted the formulation in the old inter partes reexamination
statute.319  However, out of caution that courts would interpret the phrase to
require a “scorched-earth search around the world” for prior art, the term
was softened.320  The softening leaves open the question whether “reasona-
bly” is to be interpreted in light of what the challenger could have easily
uncovered prior to filing, what it actually knew when the petition was filed, or
what it thought could be handled in a single petition, given the strict page
and time limits imposed by the PTO.321  The more reasonably the challenger
is treated, the higher the cost to the patent holder and to the PTAB.  But
even if “reasonably” is interpreted to provide the strongest possible protec-
tion to the patent holder, there would still be considerable vulnerability.  The
estoppel applies only to the claims that were challenged.  And in CBMs, the
estoppel extends only to grounds actually raised.  While the PGR estoppel
provision now reads the same as the IPR provision, there is reason to believe
that the legislators thought that the short time frame for seeking review mili-
tated in favor of a narrow estoppel and that the error will be fixed in future
legislation.322
Even more important are the limitations inherent in the second and
third phrases: the estoppel provisions apply only to the parties, their “priv-
ies,” and “real parties in interest.”  While the legislative history indicates that
these are to be equitable and practical determinations based on the activities
of the parties,323 a set of IPRs concerning patents held by VirnetX suggests
these concepts may not go very far in protecting patent holders’ interests.  In
that situation, Apple had been successfully sued by VirnetX for infringement.
It then brought seven IPRs to challenge VirnetX’s patent claims, but the peti-
tions were dismissed as untimely, given the earlier litigation.324  RPX Corpo-
ration, to which Apple subscribes, then brought seven IPRs of its own to
challenge the same claims.325  As might be expected, these petitions were all
dismissed upon a finding that Apple was the real party in interest, with the
Board reasoning that if Apple had been out of time, then so was RPX.326
319 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1999) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2012)).
320 Matal, supra note 7, at 618–19 (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, R
2011 (statement of Senator Kyl)).
321 The PTAB’s first interpretation of the provision was not informative as all the art
raised in the second petition had, in fact, been asserted in the first. See Dell Inc. v. Elecs. &
Telecomms. Research Inst., No. IPR2015-00549 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 26, 2015) (institution
decision).
322 Matal, supra note 7, at 617–18.
323 Id. at 619–20.
324 35 U.S.C. § 315(a); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., Nos. IPR2013-00348, -00349, and
-00354 (P.T.A.B. Dec 13, 2013) (institution decision); Apple Inc. v. VirnetX Inc., Nos.
IPR2013-00393, -0394, -0397, -0398 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 18, 2013) (same).  Apple also tried
unsuccessfully to join some IPRs that New Bay Capital had filed. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v.
VirnetX, Inc., No. IPR 2013-00354 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 13, 2013).
325 RPX Corp. v. Virnetx Inc., Nos. IPR2014-00171, -00172, -00173, -00174, -00175,
-00176, and -00177 (P.T.A.B. June 5, 2014).
326 Id. at 10.
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Notably however, Apple’s mere membership in RPX was not considered
enough to bind RPX to the Apple dismissal.  Rather, what mattered was the
compensation Apple paid to RPX, its suggestion that RPX file against patents
of “questionable quality” (which the record showed included the VirnetX
patents), the sharing of attorneys and experts, the similarity between Apple’s
and RPX’s petitions, and the fact that Apple was the only RPX subscriber that
had a significant interest in the case.327  Absent these factors—and one must
assume that parties will make sure that these factors are absent or, at least not
ascertainable, in later cases—industry groups, trade associations, and other
patent risk management organizations will likely be able to organize succes-
sive attacks on patent portfolios, aimed at debilitating the ability of the patent
holder to maintain an effective defense.328
Now that the Supreme Court has made it clear that decisions of adminis-
trative agencies are entitled to preclusive effect on the same standard as court
decisions,329 doctrines of issue preclusion and stare decisis could play an
important role in protecting patent holders caught in such multiple chal-
lenges.  However, because of the relative time frame of these procedures and
appeals, these doctrines will be helpful only if cases like Versata, where the
decision to institute was considered reviewable after the PTAB issued a final
written decision, and Proxyconn, where the Federal Circuit refused to defer to
the PTAB on the merits, are rare.  Otherwise reversals will wreak havoc on
the system.330  Rehearings are possible, but the regulation requires they be
made within thirty days of a final written decision, well before the Federal
Circuit is likely to decide an appeal.331  And even if it is assumed that patent
holders can rely on PTAB decisions on law and fact, preclusion doctrines
raise their own set of problems.
Once again, the thorniest issue is likely to be claim construction.  As we
have seen, the PTAB is frequently called upon to interpret the same claims in
multiple actions brought by the same or different parties.332  Often the prob-
327 Id. at 8.
328 Significantly, the PTO is considering a proposal to increase discovery on real-party-
in-interest issues.  Lee, supra note 37.
329 B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1307 (2015) (holding
that the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s decisions are entitled to preclusive effect).
330 In cases where the Federal Circuit does reverse the PTAB, the rules of preclusion
would require application of the appellate decision. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 27 cmt. o (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
331 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2014).
332 See, e.g., Kyocera Corp v. Softview LLC, No. IPR2013-00004 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014)
(consolidated in single written decision with Motorola Mobility LLC v. Softview, No. IPR2013-
00257, since both challenged Patent 7,831,926), aff’d, Softview LLC v. Kyocera Corp., 592
F. App’x 949 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., No. CBM2013-00019
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 8, 2013); Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., No. CBM2013-00020 (P.T.A.B.
Oct. 7, 2013).  In those cases, the Board considered two challenges to the same set of
claims, construed them, and declined to institute in No. CBM2013-000019, but did insti-
tute in No. CBM2013-00020; ultimately the Board held the claims unpatentable on the
construction used upon institution.
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lem of whether the same construction should be used within the PTAB is
solved by joining the petitions.  More informally, sometimes the same panel
decides all the related challenges.333  Nevertheless, there have been situa-
tions where the question of a claim’s construction arose after a final written
decision on the same claim.  In those cases, the PTAB appears to use the
same construction, albeit without specifically stating that it is relying on pre-
clusion principles.334  When the claim construction is used against the patent
holder, this outcome is unremarkable: the construction of the patent
holder’s claim is a core issue in every case and as long as the claim has not
expired, the PTAB always uses the BRI.  Accordingly, the same issue arising
in the second action was actually litigated, decided, and essential to the judg-
ment in a prior adjudication involving that party that reached a final conclu-
sion.335  Of course, if a new challenger comes along, that party has the right
to seek a different interpretation of the claims.  However, unless the chal-
lenger has a radically different argument, stare decisis should lead to the
same result (in this way, stare decisis promotes uniform interpretation of pat-
ent claims).
Much harder is the question whether the construction announced by
the PTAB binds the challenger in court.  This problem will, of course, not
arise if the claim is cancelled.  However, if the claim is upheld under the BRI,
the patent holder may well seek to enforce the patent against the unsuccess-
ful challenger.  In that case, can the accused infringer—who previously
argued for a broad claim construction in the PTAB—now argue for a differ-
ent, narrower, construction in court?336  The estoppel provisions carefully
left it open to the unsuccessful challenger to argue it did not infringe, but
infringement is more likely if the claim is interpreted broadly (as in the
PTAB) than narrowly (as in court).
Under current practice, there should be no preclusion because the issue
of what the claim means to the ordinary artisan is not the same as the issue of
what constitutes the broadest reasonable interpretation.337  In a way, use of a nar-
rower standard protects the public interest because at the margin, it allows
for freer use of advanced technologies.  At the same time, however, there is
something unseemly about allowing a party to argue for a broad construction
333 See supra note 332.
334 See SAP Am., Inc. v. Lakshmi Arunachalam, No. CBM2013-00013, at 9 (P.T.A.B.
Sept. 18, 2014) (“We addressed the construction of [a certain term] in . . . IPR2013-00194.
See SAP Am., Inc. v. Arunachalam . . . . We apply the same construction in this proceed-
ing.”); see also Apple, Inc., No. CBM2013-00020, at 3; Apple Inc. v. Sightsount Techs. LLC,
No. CBM2013-00023, at 26 (P.T.A.B. Oct. 7, 2014) (involving different patents, which were
heard together and decided separately, but appear to have been resolved through various
common issues, including some claim construction, in tandem).
335 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
336 Chien and Helmers refer to this as the “Angora cat” play: the cat is fluffed up in the
validity proceeding so it looks quite large and wetted down in the infringement action so it
appears to be very small.  Chien & Helmers, supra note 35, at 16.
337 See B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309–10 (2015)
(noting that the tribunals must be using the same legal standard).
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when it suits its interest in invalidating the patent, and then a narrower con-
struction when the issue is its own infringement.338  While that would argue
for barring the challenger (and only the challenger) from rearguing claim
construction, allowing strangers to obtain a different construction—one that
allows them to evade a patent enforceable against PTAB challengers—would
distort competition among rival users of the same technology.  Such a result
might also chill use of the review mechanisms, for no one would want to be
placed at a competitive disadvantage.
The discrepancy could be avoided by limiting use of the BRI to cases
where there was no prior construction of the claim by a district court.339  But
that would require the PTAB to use two different approaches, depending on
the order in which parallel proceedings are adjudicated.  As argued earlier, it
would be much better to eliminate the discrepancy by requiring district
courts to adopt the PTAB’s approach and apply the BRI or, as Congress is
considering,340 requiring the PTAB to use the district court standard.  Either
way, strangers would of course still not be estopped by the prior construction,
but stare decisis would apply.341  Allowing patent holders to rely on prior
PTAB claim constructions in enforcement actions would streamline litigation
and provide winning patent holders with a degree of repose.
There are many other issues that arise in the course of PTAB review that
could also have relevance in later proceedings.342  These include factual mat-
ters, such as the priority date accorded the application, the effective date of
references, the level of skill of an ordinary artisan, what the prior art teaches
and its accessibility, whether the written description is adequate, and legal
questions such as whether the invention is anticipated or obvious, whether
the claim is drawn to nonpatentable subject matter, or whether it is fully
enabled and distinctly claimed.  In some instances, these decisions are made
at the institution stage—for example, when the PTAB rejects a challenge
based on a finding that the written description is adequate or that certain
prior art does not render the invention obvious.343  Such decisions (decisions
338 The patent holder can play this game (or its inverse) as well. See Motorola Mobility
LLC v. Arnouse, No. IPR2013-00010, at 10 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014) (attempting to assert a
narrower construction in the PTAB than in court).
339 Cf. Kenny and Forman, supra note 209, at 1084 (suggesting that the PTAB use prior
district court claim constructions).
340 S. 1137, 114th Cong. § 11 (Manager’s Amendment).
341 See Teva Pharms. U.S., Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 839 (2015) (“[A]ttorneys
will no doubt bring cases construing the same claim to the attention of the trial judge;
those prior cases will sometimes be binding because of issue preclusion and sometimes will
serve as persuasive authority.” (citation omitted)).
342 See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., No. CBM2013-00004, at
3 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2014), aff’d, Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No.
2014-1466, 2015 WL 5004949 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 24, 2015).  In those cases, the same evidence
used in CBM2012-00002 was submitted.
343 There are also situations where there is a decision to institute on some grounds, but
not others. See, e.g., Apple Inc. v. Sightsound Techs., No. CBM2013-00023 (Oct. 8, 2013)
(institution decision).
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not to institute) are, in a sense, final and using them would provide strong
protection to the repose interests of patent holders.  However, they cannot
be accorded preclusive effect.  Panels do not regard themselves as bound by
decisions such as claim construction made at that stage, even though they
give the issues considerable thought and often write long opinions.  Further-
more, the decisions lack the safeguards that give rise to administrative estop-
pel: most glaringly, decisions concerning institution are appealable, if at all,
only in connection with a final written decision.344  Nor can they be set aside
by suing the PTAB in a district court.345  Notably, the estoppel provisions of
the statute turn on whether the review “results in a final written decision,”
not a decision to institute.346
In cases where the issues are resolved in a final written decision, differ-
ent considerations come into play.  Because the PTAB and the courts use the
same approach to issues other than claim construction,347 there is good rea-
son to give decisions preclusive or stare decisis effect.  But there are compli-
cations.  In some cases, the PTAB grapples with more than one distinct
ground of invalidity and there may be a question as to which ground led to
the cancellation, for only issues actually decided and essential to the judgment
are entitled to preclusive effect.348  In some cases, neither ground may be
precluded; in others (novelty and nonobviounsess), the relationship between
the issues may be such that the decision is preclusive as to both grounds.  In
addition, courts distinguish between ultimate and penultimate issues: medi-
ate facts may not be entitled to the same preclusive effect.349  For instance, in
a novelty determination, there may be several ways to reach the conclusion
that the prior art predated the invention; no particular date should be given
preclusive effect because the significance of that date in a later case may be
different.  Thus, neither the parties nor the decisionmaker may have fully
appreciated the need to give it the optimal degree of scrutiny.350
The bottom line is that the approaches that the PTAB takes to these issues
may be extremely valuable later, for they may form the starting points of
344 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2012) (regarding IPR); id. § 324(e) (regarding PGR); Versata
Dev. Group, Inc. v. Lee, 793 F.3d 1306, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (regarding review of a CBM);
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC. 793 F.3d 1268, 1273–74 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (regarding
review of an IPR).  PTAB decisions to vacate an institution are also not appealable. See
GTNX, Inc. v. INTTRA, Inc., 789 F.3d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
345 Versata, 793 F.3d at 1315.
346 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(1) (regarding PGR).
347 The standard for determining definiteness is arguably an exception, see supra note
139 and accompanying text. R
348 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
349 Originally, the first determination of mediate effects never received preclusive
effect. See Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 928–31 (2d Cir. 1944).  Even now, courts
inquire into the relationship between the claims and the opportunities the parties had to
litigate. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015); DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 54–56 (2001).
350 Cf. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1309–10 (2015)
(inquiring as to whether the stakes in the two proceedings were equivalent).
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further analysis of particular issues.  More important, if potential challengers
realize that they are unlikely to procure different views from different PTAB
panels, some of the current filing frenzy may peter out.  But like the defini-
tion of “reasonably” and “privity,” concepts of preclusion will not make Dam-
ocles’ sword disappear.
As the PTO is beginning to recognize,351 there are many ways in which it
could improve the situation itself.  The page, discovery, and other limitations
may be forcing challengers to split their arguments into multiple petitions
(some of which may later be joined by the PTAB).352  Petitioners may also be
dividing challenges among industry groups, lest they run afoul of the estop-
pel provisions.  As suggested earlier, it may make sense to alter some of the
limits in order to allow petitioners to challenge a single patent or a family of
patents more efficiently.  There may also be ways to make better use of the
power the AIA provides to stay, transfer, consolidate, or terminate petitions
that substantially repeat the arguments in other petitions.353  In particular,
the PTO could institutionalize the process of consolidating cases in ways that
benefit the patent holder as well as the PTAB.
The PTO (or an ambitious researcher) might also take a hard look at
settlements to get a fuller picture of what is going on.  The AIA requires that
all settlement agreements and collateral agreements referring to settlements
be in writing and filed with the PTO.354  Upon request of the parties, these
can be kept confidential, but they are available to government agencies and
to any person on a showing of good cause.355  As the number of settlements
grows, it becomes increasingly important to learn what is going on.  Are mul-
tiple proceedings forcing patent holders into improvident settlements?  Are
reverse trolls extracting nuisance payments?  Are patent holders paying off
petitioners to drop challenges that would have led to the cancellation of
claims?  As noted earlier, the PTO does not necessarily terminate review
351 See Lee, supra note 37.
352 See Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., Nos. IPR2012-00026 & -00109 (P.T.A.B. Feb.
19, 2014), rev’d, 789 F.3d 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (reversing both decisions in a single opin-
ion).  Time pressure on the PTAB also forces the parties to narrow their arguments. Cf.
Nichia Corp v. Emcore Corp., No. IPR2012-00005, at 51 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 11, 2014) (rejecting
a motion to amend claims because the submission caused unnecessary delay and noting
that “[t]he burden should not be placed on the Board to sort through Emcore’s patent
claims and proposed claims to determine which limitations are added and which limita-
tions are eliminated”), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 959 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
353 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (2012) (regarding IPR); id. § 325(d) (regarding PGR);
Conopco, Inc. DBA Unilever v. Proctor & Gamble Co., No. IPR2014-00507 (P.T.A.B. July 7,
2014) (using discretionary power to refuse to institute repetitive challenge); Matal, supra
note 7, at 614 (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. S1042 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sena-
tor Kyl) (asserting that the AIA protects against multiple challenges)).
354 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (regarding IPR); id. § 327(b) (regarding PGR).
355 Id.  Not all agreements are confidential. See, e.g., MeridianLink v. DH Holdings,
LLC, No. CBM2013-00008 (P.T.A.B. June 24, 2013) (institution decision).  The parties in
MeridianLink settled after the PTAB instituted on some, but not all claims. MeridianLink,
No. CBM2013-00008.  However, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the agreements that
are available because the significance of selection effects is difficult to assess.
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upon settlement (Cuozzo was such a case),356 but the decision to terminate is
discretionary.357  With more information about the terms of past settlements,
the PTO might, in the future, choose to ask for more information before
agreeing to terminations.
The PTO cannot, however, alter the statutory terms of estoppel.  Fur-
thermore, it is unlikely to interpret them in ways that significantly cut down
on the number of potential challenges or challengers.  A broad rule on
access has an important benefit: it provides more opportunity to ensure the
quality of issued patents.  It opens the system to parties with a variety of per-
spectives on the impact of patents on the public interest.  Moreover, it forces
the PTO to engage with the consumers of the patent system and to consider
arguments that its ordinary “customers”—the patent community—would be
unlikely to raise.
B. Public Interest Considerations
The last observation is significant: it suggests that Damocles’ sword has
two edges.  Congress enacted these procedures because it was concerned that
patents of dubious validity were inhibiting innovation and taxing lawful
enterprises.  Complaints about NPEs asserting poor-quality patents, bringing
bogus infringement actions, and extorting licenses had captured legislative
attention.  Further, there was concern that the cost of challenging these pat-
ents in court was too high, that small firms could not afford it and even large
ones were waiting to see, hoping someone else would incur the costs so they
could free ride on the result.358  The Myriad case359 exposed another flaw:
because standing in court largely limits the class of potential challengers to
entities within the same industrial sector as the patent holder, no one raises
questions that call the entire industry’s holdings into question.  By the time
someone manages, so many patents may have issued, the judges become
reluctant to invalidate them.360
Thus, while Congress could protect patent holders from multiple attacks
by revising the AIA to limit standing and the PTO could probably, by regula-
tion, enlarge the scope of privity or the concept of real party in interest, these
changes would undermine core rationales for establishing the procedures.
To put this another way, organizations like RPX, EFF, the Coalition for
356 See supra note 255. R
357 Oracle Corp. v. Cmty. United IP., No. CBM2013-00015 (P.T.A.B. July 25, 2013) (ter-
mination of proceeding).
358 Patent Trolls: Fact or Fiction? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet & Intel-
lectual Property of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1–3 (2006) (statement of Rep.
Lamar Smith, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Courts., the Internet, and Intellectual Prop.).
359 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
360 See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“If I were deciding this case on a blank canvas, I might conclude
that an isolated DNA sequence that includes most or all of a gene is not patentable subject
matter.” (Moore, J., concurring and holding DNA sequences patentable)), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
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Affordable Drugs, and UnifiedPatents are, in a sense, the “good guys” in that
they solve the collective action problem by pooling the resources of their
members.  Unified, for example, uses its subscription fees to
monitor troll activity, investigate prior art, challenge troll-owned patents in
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office through ex-parte reexamination and
inter partes review, and purchase patents before trolls can (but never to
purchase patents from trolls).  When Unified purchases a patent, all . . .
members receive an immediate, perpetual license to that patent.361
The Electronic Frontier Foundation claims to be saving podcasting;362
the Coalition says it is attacking “pharmaceutical companies sitting on ridicu-
lous patents that are stealing from the American public.”363  Admittedly, it is
important to distinguish between these defensive patent aggregators and
reverse trolls, who may be using the threat of an IPR for extortionate pur-
poses.  One reason to look carefully at what is happening in settlement is to
identify criteria that would enable the PTO to sort the cases accurately and in
ways that protect the interests of both the public and the patent holder.
If the public value of these procedures is to be maintained, three other
matters require attention.  First is the question of cost.  In most of these
cases, the parties rely on several experts, and they often use as much discov-
ery and engage in as much motion practice as the rules and the PTAB per-
mit.  As noted earlier, the cost of multiple actions is a heavy imposition on
patent holders.  But the high cost of pursuing these actions (which also
involve filing fees364) may also discourage challengers, especially public inter-
est groups, such as the ones that brought the Myriad case (the American Civil
Liberties Union and coalitions of scientists interested in conducting funda-
mental research with the isolated genes Myriad had patented).
In very strong cases, these would-be challengers could bypass these pro-
cedures and sue in court, with the intent of asking for judgment on the
pleadings.  Where the grounds for invalidation are based entirely on recent
case law (such as Alice), an evidentiary record may be unnecessary.  Indeed,
courts have shown themselves receptive to that approach.365  Litigation has a
significant advantage: it avoids having to make anticipatory arguments and
361 MARTA BELCHER & JOHN CASEY, HACKING THE PATENT SYSTEM 4 (May 2014), https://
www.eff.org/files/2014/05/29/hacking_the_patent_system.pdf.
362 See Michael Lipkin, EFF Wins PTAB Attack Against Podcasting Patent, LAW360 (Apr. 10,
2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/642071/eff-wins-ptab-attack-against-podcasting-
patent (referencing Elec. Frontier Found. V. Personal Audio, LLC, No. IPR2014-00070
(P.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2014)).
363 Loney, supra note 315, at 4 (quoting Kyle Bass).
364 37 CFR § 42.15 (2014).  While the fees start relatively low, they rise with the number
of claims challenged.  For example, requesting an IPR costs $9000, with a post institution
fee of $14,000.  But requests for IPR review of claims in excess of 20 costs $200 per claim
plus a post-institution fee of $400 for each claim in excess of 15.  CBMs are substantially
more expensive. Id.
365 See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (affirming a
judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and invalidating
claims on the basis of Alice).
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lining up evidence and witnesses so the process can go forward on a tight
time frame.  The litigation route will not, however, be effective in cases where
the lower burden of proof available in the PTAB is critical.  Accordingly, the
PTO might consider instituting an analogue to judgment on the pleadings.
For example, it could develop a fast track for challenges that do not require
the kinds of preparation currently devoted to so many of the cases.
Second is the question of attorney choice.  Appearance before the PTAB
is limited to practitioners registered to practice before the PTO, even though
petitions rarely raise issues that only a patent prosecutor can answer.  While
the Board may recognize backup (but not lead) counsel pro hac vice366 and
has done so in many proceedings, the requirement limits the choices both
parties can make and increases their costs.  In many of these reviews, both
sides are already involved in litigation, so the requirement can force them to
add a new member to the team and invest in bringing him or her up to
speed.  Also troubling is that only attorneys with “established familiarity with
the subject matter at issue in the proceeding” can be recognized pro hac
vice,367 for this limitation raises the question whether attorneys for groups
like the American Civil Liberties Union, the Association for Molecular
Pathology, or university counsel will be allowed to appear on behalf of
researchers or the public.  If not, then the rule will tend to limit the type of
issues raised to ones that the patent system already considers on a regular
basis.
Even more important is the question of appellate jurisdiction over PTAB
decisions.  The AIA contemplates broad authority to appeal.  It provides that
“[a] party dissatisfied with the final written decision” may appeal and “[a]ny
party to the . . . review shall have the right to be a party to the appeal.”368
The Federal Circuit has, however, been extremely skeptical of patent chal-
lengers,369 and its decision in Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation370 (WARF) could make these procedures profoundly unattractive
as a means of protecting the public interest.
In that case, a “not-for-profit public charity dedicated to providing a
voice for taxpayers and consumers in special interest-dominated public dis-
course, government and politics,”371 challenged WARF’s stem cell patents,
which have historically created a substantial obstacle to important life sci-
ences research.  The charity lost before the PTAB; when it sought to appeal,
366 37 CFR § 42.10(c).
367 Id.
368 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012) (regarding IPR); id. § 329 (regarding PGR).
369 See, e.g., Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(shifting the burden of proof in a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement), rev’d
sub nom., Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); MedIm-
mune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (denying standing to
licensees seeking to bring declaratory judgment action for invalidity), rev’d, MedImmune
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); see also generally Burstein, supra note 16.
370 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
371 Id. at 1260.
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it was denied the right to do so on the ground it lacked standing.372  The
patent was upheld in a reexamination, and not in one of the new procedures.
However, the reexamination statute likewise gives participants a right to
appeal.373  That provision made no difference to the Federal Circuit.  Citing
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife374 for the proposition that Congress cannot
evade the constitutional limits set out in Article III and Hollingsworth v.
Perry375 for the principle that the same “constitutional requirements for
standing apply on appeal, just as they do before district courts,”376 Judge
Rader reasoned that because Consumer Watchdog is not itself engaged in
research or commercial activities involving stem cells, it had not sustained an
injury in fact, traceable to the challenged action, that could be redressed by
judicial action.  Thus, he concluded it did not have standing to appeal.
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the case.377  However, the out-
come certainly bears reconsideration in the context of the new procedures,
for the inability to appeal will surely chill their use by parties Congress may
have been particularly interested in attracting.  Significantly, neither Lujan
nor Hollingsworth is directly on point. Lujan involved standing to bring an
action in an Article III trial court; Hollingsworth concerned the right of a party
that had not participated in the trial to appeal the district court’s decision.
Thus, neither case addressed the right of a party who had suffered judgment
to have the adverse decision reviewed.  In contrast, the facts in ASARCO Inc.
v. Kadish378 (which Judge Rader failed to cite) are much closer to those of
Consumer Watchdog.  In ASARCO, the Court found jurisdiction to review a
state court judgment that invalidated a mining claim, even though under
Article III, the petitioners could not have raised their federal question in a
federal court in the first instance.  The Court applied the Lujan analysis (in
that sense, the Federal Circuit was correct).  However, the Court analyzed the
case from an appellate perspective, taking into account the parties’ position
after the state court judgment was rendered.  According to the Court,
[I]t is undisputed that the decision to be reviewed poses a serious and imme-
diate threat to the continuing validity of [petitioners’ interests] . . . . The
state proceedings ended in a declaratory judgment adverse to petitioners, an
adjudication of legal rights which constitutes the kind of injury cognizable in
this Court on review from the state courts.379
372 Id. at 1261–62; see also generally Karl Bergman & Gregory D. Graff, The Global Stem
Cell Patent Landscape: Implications for Efficient Technology Transfer and Commercial Development,
25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 419 (2007).
373 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1999) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012)).
374 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
375 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
376 Consumer Watchdog, 753 F.3d at 1260–61.
377 Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 135 S. Ct. 1401 (2015).
378 490 U.S. 605 (1989).
379 Id. at 618; see also Joan Steinman, Shining a Light in a Dim Corner: Standing to Appeal
and the Right to Defend a Judgment in the Federal Courts, 38 GA. L. REV. 813, 839 (2004)
(“Unlike standing to sue, which typically attaches to claims, standing to appeal attaches to
discrete rulings and issues.”); cf. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2686 (2013)
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL105.txt unknown Seq: 62  8-DEC-15 16:57
296 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
The Court therefore held the petitioners had standing to appeal.
A challenger who loses in the PTAB is in a very similar position to the
parties that sought review in ASARCO.  As we saw, the estoppel effect of PTAB
decisions is triggered by the final written decision.  Thus, under the statute,
the challenger can no longer seek to invalidate the patent claim on any
ground it raised—or for PGRs and IPRs, reasonably could have raised—dur-
ing the PTAB proceeding.  Furthermore, in both PRGs and IPRs, the parties
who are in privity with the challenger or are considered its real parties in
interest are also estopped.  In an RPX-type case, for example, that would
include RPX members such as Apple.  If the concept of privity were
expanded as described in the previous Part to protect patent holders from
abuse, it would also include other RPX subscribers, all of whom would have
to seek licenses to practice patents that may, in fact, be invalid.
Arguably, a party that does not have the right to appeal ought not be
estopped.  However, it is far from clear the Federal Circuit would see things
that way.  There is, after all, no federal right to an appeal.  Moreover,
ASARCO dealt with a very similar argument and rejected it on the ground
that removing the preclusive effect of the state court judgment would under-
cut it and, in effect, impose federal standing requirements on a tribunal that
is not subject to Article III.380  Furthermore, even if the challengers were not
technically precluded, the PTAB judgment could have effects equally adverse
to the interests of the challenger, its privies, and its real parties in interest—
indeed, adverse to the interests of all members of the relevant industry.
Given the lower burden of proof and broader claim construction used by the
PTAB (as well as the win/loss statistics presented above), any patent that sur-
vives PTAB review becomes essentially “bullet proof.”  No jury, for example, is
likely to find a patent invalid after being told that the experts on the PTAB
(indeed, a “death squad”) had upheld it.381
To be sure, there are important differences between ASARCO and Con-
sumer Watchdog.  While the PTAB, like a state court, is a non-Article III tribu-
nal, the respect that the Supreme Court accords to the decisions of the courts
of other sovereigns is unlikely to be conferred on the Board, which is merely
an arm of a federal administrative agency.  Furthermore, in ASARCO, the
lower court had invalidated the petitioners’ mining claims.  Thus, they were
directly injured by the decision.  Because the lower tribunal had upheld the
patent claim, the harm to Consumer Watchdog is different.  Nonetheless, a
(permitting the United States to appeal a decision on the constitutionality of the Defense
of Marriage Act even though the Executive agreed with the trial court); Camreta v. Greene,
131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011) (permitting a winning party to appeal a decision on qualified
immunity in order to dispositively establish the boundaries of a doctrine that will “have a
significant future effect”).
380 ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 622.
381 Cf. Gunn v. Minton, No. 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).  In Gunn, the Supreme Court was
not concerned about the effect of a state court decision on a patent law matter.  Unlike the
PTAB, which deserves considerable deference on its patentability determinations, state
court determinations of patent issues have little influence on how federal courts analyze
them. See id.
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validated patent causes harm that is immediate and concrete.  For example,
the patents RPX was challenging had already been enforced against Apple
successfully.
Significantly, the Supreme Court has long endorsed special rules on jus-
ticiability in particular classes of cases,382 and these appear to include patent
validity cases.  As Justice Brennan pointed out in Franchise Tax Board v. Con-
struction Laborers Vacation Trust, federal courts have always adjudicated claims
of invalidity brought by alleged (not merely proven) patent infringers.383  In
Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International Inc., the Supreme Court, having
“identified a strong public interest in the finality of judgments in patent liti-
gation,” prevented the Federal Circuit from vacating a finding of patent inva-
lidity, even though the decision in the case rested on the adequate and
independent ground that the patent was not infringed.384  The Court was
concerned that if the patent was not invalidated, it would “impose[ ] ongoing
burdens.”385  Similarly, in Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., the
Court permitted the party that had won below on a finding of noninfringe-
ment to pursue an appeal in order to have a judgment of validity vacated.386
It is also worth noting that the Federal Circuit’s several attempts to restrict
the availability of declaratory judgments of invalidity have been rebuffed by
the Supreme Court on the theory that “the public . . . has a paramount inter-
est in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate
scope.”387
Finally, narrowing standing in these cases would not serve the goals of
Article III and could do serious mischief.388  While standing is often thought
to have a gatekeeping dimension, fees, coupled with the criteria for institu-
tion, effectively filter out frivolous challenges.  Article III is also said to play a
role in screening out cases raising federalism concerns, but patents are fed-
eral rights that preempt state law.389  Nor does a narrow standing rule pro-
tect the integrity of the adjudicatory system the way that barring ideological
382 See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (recognizing taxpayer standing
in a class of Establishment Clause cases); see also generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to
Make Sense of Supreme Court Standing Cases—A Plea for the Right Kind of Realism, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 105, 116, 120, 125 (2014) (giving examples of suits to enjoin criminal
prosecutions, appeals by the government when money is at stake, and suits to remove a
cloud over an important industry).
383 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 19 n.19 (1983).
384 Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993) (relying on
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971),
which was also concerned with the effect of invalid patents on third parties).
385 Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 101.
386 Elec. Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U.S. 241 (1939).
387 Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 851 (2014) (altera-
tion in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg.
Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
388 See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy”
Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 306 (1979); Steinman, supra note 379, at 829–31.
389 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989).
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litigants sometimes protects the judiciary from manipulation.  Quite the con-
trary: if the participation of these litigants is chilled, the PTO will once again
hear only from those it regulates.390  Instead of being exposed to broader,
public-interest-based considerations, the PTO will become as subject to cap-
ture as it was before these procedures were instituted.  Additionally, these
proceedings are important in part because they ameliorate the collective-
action problem that the Supreme Court created with its decision in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation to give nonparties
the benefit of a judgment invalidating a patent.391  It would be ironic if the
Court’s Article III standing jurisprudence stood in the way of mitigating
Blonder-Tongue’s damaging side effect.
While Congress cannot ignore the requirements of Article III, the ques-
tion of who has standing to appeal raises very close questions; the court that
considers them would do well to take account of the reasons these proce-
dures were crafted as they were.392  At the very least, the Federal Circuit
should look behind the interests of the named petitioner.  Unlike other cases
involving standing to appeal agency actions, where evidence on the party’s
relationship to the decision is not readily ascertainable,393 these procedures
require the petition to identify the parties and related matters that would be
affected by the proceeding.394
CONCLUSION
As a member of the National Academies Committee that brought atten-
tion to the need for (what was then called) post-grant opposition, I read
these decisions with deep satisfaction.  The PTAB is, indeed, the “technologi-
cally sophisticated environment” in which questionable claims can be effi-
ciently challenged.395  The judges display considerable familiarity with the
technologies at issue and bring to the adjudication a deep understanding of
patent jurisprudence.  As the statistics suggest, the petitions target patents of
genuinely dubious value.  The cases also restore a degree of public confi-
dence in the patent system.  For example, while the PTAB has instituted a
large number of challenges to patents owned by NPEs, the invalidation rate
for these patents has not been particularly high, suggesting that the so-called
390 Brilmayer, supra note 388, at 316.  Brilmayer observes that standing is more likely to
be granted when the issue will not otherwise be litigated—precisely the fear sparked by the
Federal Circuit’s reluctance to find standing in Myriad. Id.
391 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
392 Cf. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (“In my view, Congress has the power to define
injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court’s opinion to suggest a contrary view.”).
393 See Amy J. Wildermuth & Lincoln L. Davies, Standing, on Appeal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV.
957, 965–66.
394 See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (2012) (regarding IPR); id. § 322(a)(3) (regarding PGR);
37 CFR §§ 42.8(b)(1)–(2) (2012).
395 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. R
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trolls may, in fact, be doing more good (by monetizing patent holdings and
lowering transaction costs) than harm.
Still, there are many issues that demand further thought.  So far, the
Federal Circuit has displayed significant reluctance about sharing its author-
ity.  Nevertheless, there are both institutional and normative reasons to give
the Patent Office a larger role in the development of patent jurisprudence
and to allow the PTAB to serve as a true partner in improving patent law and
the administration of justice.  PTAB decisions are technically superb and
offer opportunities for dialogue among courts on open questions, including
implementation of Supreme Court cases and the substantive provisions of the
AIA.  However, the PTAB hews closely to the Federal Circuit tradition of sup-
pressing all discussion of policy.  As a result, percolation is not likely to be as
effective as it might be.  Difficult institutional questions are raised by inject-
ing inter partes adjudication in a specialized agency into a system that also
benefits from an expert appellate body.
The multiplicity of procedures creates a great deal of complexity.  The
rules on estoppel, although fairly detailed, nonetheless expose patent hold-
ers to multiple challenges.  While there are several straightforward ways to
achieve greater repose, the solutions tend to come at the expense of the pub-
lic interest in weeding out bad patents and the benefits of exposing the PTO
to a broader array of concerns.  Finding the right balance will therefore be
difficult.  For both patent holders and challengers, cost is also a significant
factor.  While the procedures are less costly than litigation, the expense may
discourage some challengers and impair the innovation industry’s ability to
defend—or indeed, to rely on patents to protect business interests.  For dis-
trict courts, multiple proceedings make it difficult to decide when to impose
a stay or dissolve it.  It may be possible to revise the procedures in ways that
promote consolidation, but there are tradeoffs between efficiency and effec-
tive process.
While this Article attempted to look beyond the numbers, there is much
further work to be done looking at the numbers.  Empirical attention to how
these challenges proceed could tease out information that might help bring
down costs.  More analysis of who is using the system would help answer ques-
tions about whether the opportunities for harassment outweigh the benefits,
especially given the federal courts’ current receptivity to judgment on the
pleadings.  The settlements in particular cry out for investigation.  As the
numbers rise, the question whether the settlements are abusive, collusive, or
improvident becomes increasingly pressing.  These procedures also create
mixed incentives.  Their availability may encourage more careful drafting
and due diligence—or they may encourage patent holders to create deeper
portfolios of rights in an effort to raise the cost of effectively challenging
their exclusivity.  Empirical work is necessary to determine which effect
dominates.
The PTAB is, indeed, well positioned to give the Federal Circuit a run
for its money.  It will be interesting to see how the Board tackles the many
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substantive questions the AIA raised and how its decisions are received by the
Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court.
